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Fiduciary duty is one of the most litigated areas in corporate law, 
and the subject of much academic attention, yet one important question 
has been ignored.  Should fiduciary liability be assessed individually, 
where directors are examined one-by-one for compliance, or collectively, 
where the board’s compliance as a whole is all that matters?  The choice 
between individual and collective assessment can be the difference 
between a director’s liability and her exoneration, affects how boards 
function, and informs the broader fiduciary duty literature in important 
ways.  This article is the first to explore the individual/collective question 
and suggest a systematic way of approaching it.  The article is both 
descriptive, in examining how some courts have answered this question 
(often implicitly), and normative, in asking whether the courts’ tentative 
answer makes for good corporate governance policy. 
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I
INTRODUCTION 
Efforts to improve corporate governance routinely focus on the 
board of directors, who enjoy almost unfettered control over the 
corporation.1 Recognizing this “director primacy,”2 policymakers, courts, 
and legal scholars constantly look for ways to improve board functioning, 
especially in the wake of scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and other 
corporations.3 Making directors independent of management is a popular 
theme,4 as are calls for subjecting directors to more robust fiduciary 
duties.  Fiduciary duties are meant to serve as a check on director power 
 
1 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 141(a) (2006) (“The business and affairs of every 
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a 
board of directors…”).   
2 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. L. REV. 547 (2003). 
3 Jill E. Fisch, Corporate Governance:  Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 265, 265 (1997) (“Today’s corporate world is taking corporate governance and, in 
particular, the role of the board of directors, very seriously.”).  
4 Director independence is a defining feature of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  
Pub. L. No. 107-204 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.).  Also, the NYSE 
and NASDAQ now require that listed companies have a majority of independent 
directors.  For skepticism about the push toward director independence, see Sanjai Bhagat 
and Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm 
Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921 (1999) (empirical study suggesting that greater director 
independence does not improve corporate performance, and that too many independent 
directors may actually hurt corporate performance); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human 
Nature of Corporate Boards:  Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of 
Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 800 (suggesting director 
independence is not necessarily a good thing and that market and social forces should be 
allowed to determine the proper amount of director independence without legal 
mandates). 
3and to provide a means of reducing agency costs between shareholders 
and directors.  Currently, however, fiduciary duties are a weak impetus for 
directors to act in the best interests of shareholders, at least to the extent 
that fiduciary law would seek to impose liability for director wrongdoing.  
This recognition has led some corporate law scholars to call for stricter 
fiduciary duties, which could take the form of an explicit duty to act in 
good faith5 or a revival of the duty of care, which is now on life support.6
Other corporate law scholars (and judging by the recent Disney case,7
Delaware courts) take a more pessimistic view of fiduciary duty law as a 
potential cure for what ails boards, preferring to leave corporate 
governance to other devices, including market sanctions.8
The fiduciary duty literature is rich and fruitful, which makes it 
surprising that one important question within fiduciary law – a question 
that bears upon all the others – has been virtually ignored.  Directors, of 
course, do not operate in isolation; they are only capable of acting by 
majority vote.  In practice, they usually act unanimously.9 Yet each 
 
5 See Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 494 
(2004) (arguing in favor of an independent duty of good faith that has the “potential for 
addressing those outrageous and egregious abdications of fiduciary behavior that are not 
simply the results of bad process or conflicts”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good 
Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 27-31 (2006) (providing normative 
justifications for an independent duty of good faith).  
6 See Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director?  Revitalizing Directors’ 
Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 407-08 (2005) 
(observing with disfavor that “[o]ver the last twenty years, a variety of mechanisms have 
contributed to a virtual elimination of legal liability for directors who breach their duty of 
care”); Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board:  Promoting 
Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105 (2006) (arguing in favor 
of due care liability calibrated by an individual director’s ability to pay); Cheryl L. Wade, 
Symposium:  Enron and Its Aftermath:  Corporate Governance Failures and the 
Managerial Duty of Care, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 767, 768 (2002) (“greater emphasis on 
standards of care for both directors and officers is warranted, especially in the aftermath 
of the corporate governance failures that scandalized Enron, WorldCom, and other large 
publicly held companies"). 
7 The Disney case, which spent the last several years bouncing between the 
Delaware Chancery and Supreme Courts, involved notably lax behavior on the part of 
Disney’s board of directors in the hiring and firing of president Michael Ovitz.  Ovitz 
received an approximately $140 million severance package for fifteen months work, and 
shareholders sued the directors alleging fiduciary duty breaches in connection with the 
payout.  The directors were ultimately exonerated by both the Delaware Chancery Court 
and the Delaware Supreme Court.  See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 
2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113 (2005); In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 2006 
Del. LEXIS 307.  This case is discussed in Section II.A.3. 
8 See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, The Mandatory Nature of the ALI Code, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 985, 1027 (1993) (“A particularly questionable academic position…is 
that fiduciary duties, structures, and remedies must be imposed by law because market 
forces alone cannot eliminate agency costs.”). 
9 Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director’s Duty of 
Attention:  Time for Reality, 39 BUS. LAW. 1477, 1489 (1984) (“Actions [of the board] 
4director is an individual, and each will either comply or not comply with 
the standards set by fiduciary law.  For example, one director may have a 
conflict of interest, while the remaining board members do not.  Also, 
different directors may have exercised different levels of carefulness in 
reaching their decisions.  Given these differences (or potential differences) 
among directors, what impact does one director’s fiduciary duty breach 
have on the liability of the remaining directors?  Or, flipping the question, 
what impact does the compliance of the remaining directors have on the 
liability of the one breaching director?  More broadly, the unexplored 
question within fiduciary duty law is how outcomes are affected when all 
directors vote the same way,10 but some directors comply with their 
fiduciary duties while others do not.  Should director liability be assessed 
individually or collectively?   
An individual focus does not allow a director to hide behind her 
counterparts, but instead deems her singular breach of sufficient gravity to 
jeopardize the board’s functioning and warrant legal sanctions.  A 
collective focus, on the other hand, will serve to insulate any one 
director’s wrongdoing provided the remaining directors complied with 
their fiduciary duties.11 Therefore, how courts answer the 
 
are usually by consensus.  If a significant sentiment of disagreement is sensed by the 
chairman, the matter is usually put over for later action, and sources of compromise and 
persuasion are pursued in the interim.”); James D. Cox and Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in 
the Boardroom:  Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate 
Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 91 (1985) (a “new board member is expected 
not only to work within the group’s collective views of the corporate interest, but also to 
cooperate with other board members in reaching decisions by group consensus”).   
10 Directors who vote against a particular course of action should be immune from 
liability.  See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 826 (NJ 1981) (“Usually a 
director can absolve himself from liability by informing the other directors of the 
impropriety and voting for a proper course of action.”); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 145 
(2004): 
Any director who may have been absent when [an unlawful dividend or 
stock repurchase] was done, or who may have dissented from the act or 
resolution by which the same was done, may be exonerated from such 
liability by causing his or her dissent to be entered on the books 
containing the minutes of the proceedings of the directors at the time 
the same was done, or immediately after such director has notice of the 
same. 
The absentee director presents a more difficult case.  Courts have held absentee 
directors liable for board decisions, although this is sometimes in the banking context 
where fiduciary duties are heightened.  See FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424, 1433 (1993) 
(“The fact that an absentee director had no knowledge of the transaction and did not 
participate in it does not absolve him of liability.”); Hoye v. Meek, 795 F.2d 893 (10th 
Cir. 1986) (holding a semi-retired bank director liable for breaching his duty of care 
because he did not take affirmative steps to become informed about the actions of another 
director).  For an example outside of the banking context, see the discussion of absentee-
director O’Boyle’s liability in Smith v. Van Gorkom, infra note 25. 
11 See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text. 
5individual/collective question has important practical ramifications.  
Although the choice between treating directors individually or collectively 
is only one of the variables in fiduciary duty suits, it has the potential to be 
the difference between a director’s liability and her exoneration.  As a 
result, it carries significant financial implications for directors, 
shareholders, insurers, and attorneys.  Moreover, how courts answer the 
individual/collective question can affect how directors interact with one 
another, and can provide important insights into the judicial view of 
fiduciary duties as a corporate governance mechanism. 
This article favors a duty-based answer to the individual/collective 
question on both descriptive and normative grounds.  First, it will show 
that courts have generally focused on the board as a whole in duty of care 
cases, and on directors as individuals in duty of loyalty cases.  Second, the 
article will argue that courts have been correct in drawing this duty-based 
distinction because it strikes the proper balance between the board’s 
authority and its accountability in each case.12 It contends that loyalty 
breaches, if committed by even a single director, are likely to impact the 
board’s functioning in a meaningfully way, and therefore those breaches 
warrant greater accountability though an individual director focus.  On the 
other hand, due care breaches committed by only one director are unlikely 
to jeopardize the board’s functioning in the same way, and therefore these 
breaches call for more deferential collective focus.  Because good faith 
now appears to be a subset of the duty of loyalty,13 and because it too 
involves intentional wrongdoing,14 allegations of bad faith also warrant an 
individual director focus.  Of course, corporate law cases do not always 
confine themselves to such tidy classifications, and this article should be 
read as proposing a general framework for analysis rather than hard-and-
fast rules to cover every situation. 
After contending that courts are properly oscillating between a 
collective and individual focus to director liability depending on the type 
of fiduciary duty at issue, this article asks what broader lessons we might 
take away from this.  It suggests that this duty-based distinction reveals a 
further splintering between the duty of care and the duty of loyalty and a 
deemphasis on fiduciary duty liability as a corporate governance 
mechanism.  On the other hand, that courts have only implicitly adopted 
the laxer collective approach in due care cases suggests that the duty of 
care is still important as an aspirational “standard of conduct,” if not a 
“standard of liability.” 
This article proceeds as follows.  Part II discusses the existing law on 
the collective versus individual treatment of directors in fiduciary duty 
 
12 See infra Part III.A.1. 
13 After the Delaware Supreme Court’s recent decision in Stone v. Ritter, 2006 WL 
3169168, it appears settled that the duty to act in good faith is a subset of the duty of 
loyalty rather than an independent fiduciary duty.  See infra Part III.B.1.b. 
14 See infra Part III.B.1. 
6suits.  This law is comprised of cases that explicitly address the question, 
cases that implicitly address it, and statutes from Delaware and the Model 
Business Corporation Act (MBCA).  Existing law reveals a preference for 
an individual director focus in duty of loyalty cases, and a preference for a 
collective focus in duty of care cases.  Part III first sets forth the normative 
criteria that should inform the choice between the two assessment 
approaches on corporate governance policy grounds, and then applies 
those criteria to the different types of fiduciary duty claims that may be 
brought.  It concludes that courts are creating good corporate governance 
policy through their duty-based distinction.  Part IV draws broader 
implications about fiduciary duties from the courts’ resolution of the 
individual/collective question.  Part V concludes. 
 
II 
THE INDIVIDUAL/COLLECTIVE QUESTION: EXISTING LAW 
Existing law on the individual/collective question is difficult to 
decipher.  Forming any sort of a coherent picture about how the law views 
this question requires piecing together case law that explicitly addresses 
the question, case law that implicitly addresses it, and relevant statutory 
provisions from Delaware and the MBCA.  Engaging in this exercise 
reveals an individual/collective focus that shifts depending on the type of 
fiduciary breach being litigated.  Duty of loyalty claims tend to be 
analyzed using an individual approach, while duty of care claims tend to 
be analyzed using a collective approach.15 
This section begins by examining three high-profile Delaware cases 
that have explicitly addressed the individual/collective question, albeit 
briefly and inadequately.  It then touches on case law that could be said to 
implicitly answer the question.  Finally, it introduces a Delaware statute 
and provision from the MBCA that speak to this question.  While other 
statutes may also be relevant, the two provisions chosen for illustration are 
important provisions that provide support for the duty-based framework 
that emerges from the case law.   
 
A.  Cases Explicitly Addressing the Individual/Collective Question 
 
1.  Smith v. Van Gorkom 
The first of the three Delaware cases to explicitly address the 
collective versus individual treatment of directors in fiduciary duty suits 
 
15 Roberta Romano makes this observation in discussing board stability.  Roberta 
Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 
1155, 1178 n. 39 (1990) (“A duty of care violation is likely to involve the entire board, 
whereas a duty of loyalty violation tends to be limited to directors (typically insiders) 
who have personally benefited from a transaction.”). 
7was the famous case of Smith v. Van Gorkom.16 In that case, decided in 
1985, the Delaware Supreme Court took the unprecedented step of holding 
all ten directors of Trans Union Corporation jointly and severally liable for 
$23.5 million for breaching their duty of care in approving the sale of the 
corporation.17 Trans Union’s Chairman and CEO, Jerome Van Gorkom, 
orchestrated the sale with the help of another inside director, Bruce 
Chelberg.  The remainder of the board was not informed of the proposal 
until the day before the buyer’s deadline for accepting it.18 The board 
approved the sale based on a twenty-minute presentation by Van Gorkom, 
supported by Chelberg, as well as the advice of Trans Union’s legal 
counsel and the directors’ “knowledge of the market history of the 
Company’s stock.”19 
When Trans Union shareholders brought a class action suit against 
the directors, the directors elected to present a unified defense.  The court 
held that “since all of the defendant directors, outside as well as inside, 
take a unified position, we are required to treat all of the directors as one 
as to whether they are entitled to the protection of the business judgment 
rule.”20 Pursuant to this collective approach, the court did not distinguish 
between Van Gorkom’s orchestration of the transaction without the 
board’s knowledge, Chelberg’s complicity, and the board’s failure to 
become adequately informed or to sufficiently deliberate once it learned of 
the proposal.  Instead, because the directors presented a uniform defense 
for their actions, the court held that they should be treated as a unit for 
assessing liability.   
In this particular case, the collective approach was adopted at the 
directors’ request.  Justice Moore, at least, appeared skeptical that a 
collective focus was appropriate.  During the appeal, the Delaware 
Supreme Court requested a special hearing to determine whether there 
were “factual or legal reasons” to treat the directors differently.21 In the 
hearing, Justice Moore and directors’ common counsel engaged in the 
following colloquy:  
 
“JUSTICE MOORE:  Is there a distinction between 
Chelberg and Van Gorkom vis-à-vis the other defendants? 
COUNSEL:  No, sir. 
 
16 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
17 It was reported, however, that the directors paid very little of this amount:  their 
D&O insurance paid $10 million, the policy limit, and the acquiror, Jay Pritzker, paid 
nearly all of the $13.5 million balance.  See Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical 
Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 BUS. LAW. 1, 1 (1985).  
18 488 A.2d at 868. 
19 Id. at 869. 
20 Id. at 889. 
21 Id. at 899. 
8JUSTICE MOORE:  None whatsoever? 
COUNSEL:  I think not.”22 
According to Charles O’Kelley and Robert Thompson, the court was 
“trying to drive a wedge between directors who were negligent or disloyal 
and those who were not.”23 The directors, however, chose the collective 
strategy in the hopes that the court would be unwilling to find the outside 
directors liable, thereby also shielding the more culpable insiders.  The 
Van Gorkom court did honor the directors’ request for collective 
treatment, but instead of exonerating the directors, it “exploded a bomb”24 
by splitting 3-2 in favor of liability for the whole board – including a 
director who was ill and had not been present at the meeting where the 
sale was approved.25 Justice Moore, one of the three judges voting in 
favor of liability, later stated that “the strategic maneuver to cast down the 
gauntlet before the Delaware Supreme Court hardly appears to have been 
among the wisest decisions in the annals of corporate America.”26 
22 Id.
23 CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY AND ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND 
OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS (4TH ed. 2003), TEACHER’S MANUAL at 111.  See also 
Jonathan R. Macey, Symposium:  Smith v. Van Gorkom:  Insights About C.E.O.s, 
Corporate Law Rules, and the Jurisdictional Competition for Corporate Charters, 96 NW
U. L. REV. 607, 609-619 (2002) (arguing that in Van Gorkom, the whole board was 
punished for Jerome Van Gorkom’s misconduct).  Cf. Elliott J. Weiss, What Lawyers Do 
When the Emperor Has No Clothes:  Evaluating CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of 
America and its Progency—Part I, 78 GEO. L. J. 1655, 1658 n. 18 (“In my view, the Van 
Gorkom court was concerned primarily with the manner in which Van 
Gorkom…presented the proposed transaction to the board, and with the outside directors’ 
refusal to dissociate themselves from Van Gorkom when they learned that he had 
provided them with incomplete information.”). 
24 Manning, supra note 17, at 1. 
25 Upon release of the court’s judgment of liability, this outside director, Thomas 
O’Boyle, was granted leave for a change of counsel.  In his motion for reargument, 
O’Boyle claimed “standing to take a position different from that of his fellow directors 
and that legal grounds exist for finding him not liable for the acts or omissions of his 
fellow directors.” 488 A.2d at 898.  The court unanimously ruled that this argument had 
been waived, noting that during trial “a special opportunity was afforded the individual 
defendants, including O’Boyle, to present any factual or legal reasons why each or any of 
them should be individually treated.”  Id. at 899. 
26 Andrew G.T. Moore II, The 1980s—Did We Save the Stockholders While the 
Corporation Burned?, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 277, 281-82 (1992): 
This [collective] position was taken even though it was obvious that 
certain directors were more culpable than others, and in the face of the 
Court’s invitation that they take separate positions with a clear hint of 
exoneration for all but the most culpable insiders….In a way, they were 
‘daring’ us to find them all liable to save certain insiders.  In light of 
our decision finding all the directors liable, the strategic maneuver to 
cast down the gauntlet before the Delaware Supreme Court hardly 
appears to have been among the wisest decisions in the annals of 
corporate America. 
92.  In re Emerging Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation 
After Van Gorkom, the Delaware courts did not explicitly revisit the 
individual/collective question until 2004, in the case of In re: Emerging 
Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation.27 This class action suit 
alleged that the directors of Emerging Communications, Inc. breached 
their fiduciary duties in approving a “going private” acquisition of the 
company by its Chairman and CEO, Jeffrey Prosser.28 The transaction 
was originally proposed to be a merger of another corporation owned by 
Prosser into Emerging Communications.  Prosser, however, “flipped” the 
transaction to a privatization in which his other corporation would acquire 
Emerging Communications due to his belief that the market had 
undervalued Emerging Communications, making it available for purchase 
at a discounted price.29 
The Emerging Communications board was comprised of seven 
directors, including inside director Prosser, inside director and company 
counsel John Raynor, and outside director and financial expert Salvatore 
Muoio.  Justice Jacobs of the Delaware Supreme Court, sitting by 
designation on the Chancery Court, found these three directors, but none 
others, jointly and severally liable for breaching their fiduciary duties of 
loyalty “and/or” good faith in approving the privatization at $10.25 per 
share given the judicially determined fair value of $38.05 per share.30 
In his opinion, without citing Van Gorkom, Justice Jacobs held that 
“[t]he liability of the directors must be determined on an individual basis 
because the nature of their breach of duty (if any), and whether they are 
exculpated from liability for that breach, can vary for each director.”31 
Applying this individual approach, Justice Jacobs imposed liability on 
Prosser for violating his duty of loyalty for self-dealing;32 Raynor for 
breaching his duty of loyalty “and/or” good faith for assisting Prosser in 
the privatization and for “consciously disregarding his duty to the minority 
 
27 2004 WL 1305745. 
28 The privatization occurred in two steps.  First, Innovative Communications 
Corporation, L.L.C., which was effectively wholly owned by Prosser and was already the 
majority stockholder of Emerging Communications, acquired 29% of Emerging 
Communications’ outstanding shares in a first-step tender offer.  Two months later, 
Innovative acquired the balance of the outstanding shares in a second-step cash-out 
merger of Emerging Communications into an Innovative subsidiary.  Id. at *1. 
29 Id. at *5. 
30 Id. at *11. 
31 Id. at *38.   
32 Prosser also breached his duty of loyalty as a majority stockholder of Emerging 
Communications “by eliminating [the company’s] minority stockholders for an unfair 
price in an unfair transaction that afforded the minority no procedural protections.”  Id. at 
*38. 
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stockholders;”33 and Muoio for breaching his duty of loyalty “and/or” 
good faith because he was not independent of Prosser and “voted to 
approve the transaction even though he knew, or at the very least had 
strong reasons to believe, that the $10.25 per share merger price was 
unfair” given his financial expertise.34 The other four directors, although 
“not independent of Prosser,”35 were exonerated because their conduct did 
not rise to the level of disloyalty or bad faith.36 
3.  In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation 
In 2005, Chancellor Chandler issued his opinion on the merits of In 
re Walt Disney Co. Derivate Litigation.37 Disney shareholders brought a 
derivative suit against the corporation’s directors in connection with the 
hiring and termination of Michael Ovitz as Disney’s president, which 
resulted in a severance payout to Ovitz of approximately $140 million for 
fifteen months work.38 The Disney board consisted of seventeen directors, 
including Chairman and CEO Michael Eisner and compensation 
committee members Irwin Russell, Raymond Watson, Sidney Poitier, and 
Ignacio “Nacho” Lozano.  Eisner was the facilitator of Ovitz’s hiring, and 
the compensation committee assumed primary responsibility for the Ovitz 
employment agreement.   
In a lengthy opinion that criticized the directors’ conduct in many 
respects,39 Chancellor Chandler nevertheless found no fiduciary duty 
breaches in connection with the Ovitz employment agreement (in this 
 
33 Id. at *39 & n. 184. 
34 Id. at *39-40. 
35 Id. at *41. 
36 Id.:
The conduct of these four directors differs from that of Raynor and 
Muoio, in that there is no evidence that any of those four affirmatively 
colluded with Prosser to effect the Privatization, or that they otherwise 
deliberately engaged in conduct disloyal to the minority stockholders’ 
interests.  Nor have the plaintiffs shown that any of those directors 
knew or had reason to believe, that the merger price was unfair.  
37 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113.  This case had been bouncing between the Delaware 
Chancery and Supreme Courts for several years.  For prior opinions in this case, see 
[cites]. 
38 See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment:  A Theory of Rhetoric in 
Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L. J. 1, 17 & n. 48 (2005) (noting that “Ovitz 
was paid approximately $140 million in stock, cash, and options,” but that this “measure 
is approximate due to the problem of valuing the equity and the options.  $140 million is 
the plaintiff’s measurement of the total cost and may be high”).  
39 The specific critiques are too numerous to list, but the gist was that Eisner acted 
as an imperial CEO who negotiated with Ovitz in secret, and that the compensation 
committee (and to a lesser extent the full board) was comprised of Eisner’s cronies who 
simply acceded to his wishes. 
11
case, the duties of care and good faith were implicated40).  Before 
analyzing the merits of fiduciary duty claims, Chancellor Chandler took 
note of the conflicting answers to the individual/collective question set 
forth in Van Gorkom and Emerging Communications:
In Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court analyzed the 
Trans Union board of directors as a whole in determining 
whether the protections of the business judgment rule 
applied.  More recent cases understand that liability must 
be on a director-by-director basis.  In Emerging 
Communications, Justice Jacobs wrote (while sitting as a 
Vice Chancellor) that the “liability of the directors must be 
determined on an individual basis because the nature of 
their breach of duty (if any), and whether they are 
exculpated from liability for that breach, can vary for each 
director.”  There is a not insignificant degree of tension 
between these two positions, notwithstanding the 
procedural differences between the two cases.41 
After noting the tension between the prior cases, Chancellor 
Chandler analyzed the conduct of the primary actors (Eisner and each of 
the compensation committee members) individually.  He determined that 
although their actions did not meet the ideal in corporate practices, neither 
did they fall below well-established fiduciary duty standards.  The actions 
of the remainder of the board were analyzed only briefly and 
collectively.42 The full board was also exonerated.43 When the Delaware 
Supreme Court affirmed the Chancellor’s decision in June 2006, it did not 
reach the substance of the individual/collective question, instead finding 
that plaintiffs’ were procedurally barred from alleging the Chancellor’s 
use of the individual approach for the primary actors as error.44 The court 
 
40 The traditional duty of loyalty claims had been dropped fairly early in the suit.  
See Griffith, supra note 38, at 18-19. 
41 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *154 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
42 The Chancellor’s opinion devotes over thirty pages to scrutinizing the role of 
Eisner and the compensation committee members in approving Ovitz’s employment 
agreement, id. at *190-224, but only three pages to all of the other directors combined.  
Id. at *225-228.  This is because the board’s sole action was to approve Ovitz as 
president – the terms of his employment were delegated to the compensation committee.  
Plaintiffs alleged this delegation as error in their appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, 
which was rejected.  2006 Del. LEXIS 307, at [cite] (“The Chancellor’s ruling – that 
executive compensation was to be fixed by the compensation committee – is legally 
correct.”). 
43 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *225-228. 
44 2006 Del. LEXIS 307, * 64: 
To begin with, the argument is precluded by Rule 8 of this Court, 
which provides that arguments not fairly presented to the trial court will 
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added that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated prejudice from this 
approach.45 
B.  Cases Implicitly Addressing the Individual/Collective Question 
 
Although Van Gorkom, Emerging Communications, and Disney all 
explicitly addressed the individual/collective question, standing alone they 
do not tell us very much.  Emerging Communications supports an 
individual focus for duty of loyalty claims, but it is only one case, and 
Justice Jacobs gave little reasoning for his individual focus.  However, 
other case law is clear that consequences flow from even one director’s 
disloyalty.  For instance, corporate opportunity cases (a subset of the duty 
of loyalty) routinely center on allegations that a single director has 
usurped a corporate opportunity.46 The consequences of disloyalty begin 
with greater judicial scrutiny of the challenged transaction, and potentially 
end with the imposition of liability on the disloyal director.47 The relevant 
Delaware statutory provision, discussed below, is equally clear that an 
individual focus is required in duty of loyalty cases.48 Although the good 
faith jurisprudence to this point has been quite confusing and in flux, 
Emerging Communications could be read to support an individual focus 
when good faith is implicated.49 
Van Gorkom and Disney are less clear in their resolution of the 
individual/collective question in duty of care cases.  In Disney, Chancellor 
Chandler cited Van Gorkom as adopting the collective focus, yet the Van 
Gorkom court chose the collective approach due to the directors’ request 
rather than through any substantive reasoning.  Similarly, it is difficult to 
know what to make of Disney, where carelessness allegations were 
interwoven with allegations of bad faith to propel plaintiffs past an early 
 
not be considered by this Court.  The appellants’ “individual vs. 
collective” argument goes beyond being not fairly presented.  It borders 
on being unfairly presented, since the appellants are taking the trial 
court to task for adopting the very analytical approach that they 
themselves used in presenting their position. 
(citation omitted).   
45 See id. (“The argument also fails because nowhere do appellants identify how 
this supposed error caused them any prejudice”). [Note: need to incorporate any post-
Disney opinions mentioning the individual/collective question, including Sample v. 
Morgan, 2007 WL 177856 (Del. Ch.), into this section.] 
46 See, e.g., Broz v. Cellular Information Systems, Inc., 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996). 
47 See id.
48 See infra Part II.C.1. 
49 See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing Justice Jacobs’ individual director focus for 
breaches of the duties of loyalty “and/or” good faith). 
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motion to dismiss.50 The Delaware Supreme Court did not address the 
substance of the individual/collective question, while Chancellor Chandler 
took somewhat of a hybrid approach, analyzing Eisner and the 
compensation committee individually and the remainder of the board 
collectively.  Looking to cases that have implicitly resolved this issue, 
however, supports Van Gorkom’s collective focus in duty of care cases. 
Courts generally do not draw distinctions among directors based on 
their inside/outside director status or expert/non-expert qualifications 
when assessing compliance with the duty of care,51 which points toward a 
collective focus.  First, even though “inside” and “outside” directors serve 
different functions,52 with inside directors being more intimately involved 
in managing corporate affairs and outside directors playing more of a 
monitoring role,53 courts generally do not hold inside directors to a higher 
 
50 Duty of care claims, standing alone, are subject to dismissal if the corporation 
has adopted a 102(b)(7) provision.  See infra notes 133-136 and accompanying text.  See 
also Norman Veasey and Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware 
Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004?  A Retrospective on Some Key 
Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1441 (2005) (“the Disney litigation – as the 
Supreme Court saw it in Brehm v. Eisner in 2000, based on the original and defective set 
of pleadings – seemed to be primarily a due care case….On remand, the case, as 
repleaded, morphed into a ‘good faith’ case.”). 
51 Courts do distinguish between inside and outside/independent directors for other 
purposes, however.  See infra note 91. 
52 This article draws a basic distinction between inside directors, who are also 
officers/management of the corporation, and outside directors, who are not.  See 
O’KELLEY AND THOMPSON, supra note 23, at 136 (inside directors are “generally the 
chief executive officer and her principal subordinate officers” while outside directors are 
“usually are employed full time as either chief executives or financial officers of other 
corporations, or are lawyers, accountants, or investment bankers”).  Outside directors 
may or may not qualify as “independent” depending on the standard used.  See Hillary A. 
Sale, Independent Directors as Securities Monitors, __ BUS. LAW. __, __ n. 4 (2006) (to 
be independent under New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rules, “directors must not have 
any significant familial or financial ties with the company,” while to be independent 
under Delaware law, “a director must not be beholden to her fellow board members and 
able to formulate her own decisions on issues free of improper influence”).  For criticism 
of the more formalistic NYSE definition of independence, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, A
Critique of the NYSE’s Director Independence Listing Standards, 30 SEC. REG. L. J. 370 
(2002).  For an alternative approach to independence, see Note, Beyond “Independent” 
Directors:  A Functional Approach to Board Independence, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1553 
(2006). 
53 See Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: 
An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 873 (1991): 
The justification for relying on outside directors as a monitoring 
mechanism is straightforward.  Because such directors are 
“independent” – that is, they do not have a personal financial stake in 
retaining management – they can act as shareholder surrogates to 
assure that the company is run in the long-term best interests of its 
owners.  
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standard of care.  For example, in Norlin v. Rooney, 54 the Second Circuit 
stated that “[w]e are not persuaded that a different test applies to 
‘independent’ as opposed to ‘inside’ directors under the business judgment 
rule.”55 There are exceptions in the case law, however,56 and outside 
directors are entitled to more reliance on reports made by corporate 
officers, accountants or appraisers in fulfilling their duty of care than are 
inside directors.57 
Courts have also tended to hold expert and non-expert directors to 
the same standard of care.  For example, in the 2006 case of Canadian 
Commercial Workers Industry Pension Plan v. Alden,58 the Delaware 
Chancery Court held that “Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants should be 
held to a higher standard of care because they are professionals [an 
accountant and a lawyer] is unavailing.”59 Norman Veasey, former Chief 
 
On monitoring vs. managing boards, see MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE 
OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1997); Fisch, supra note 3. 
54 744 F.2d 255 (2nd Cir. 1984).   
55 Id. at 260.  See also Donald E. Pease, Outside Directors:  Their Importance to 
the Corporation and Protection from Liability, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 25, 49 (1987): 
In Aronson v. Lewis, the court said that the directors have a duty to 
inform themselves of all material information reasonably available 
before making a decision and that they must act with requisite care in 
the discharge of their duties.  There is no hint in Aronson of a 
distinction between the responsibility of inside and outside directors; 
apparently they are all subject to the same standard.  
(citations omitted); In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 
A.2d 959 (1996). It should be noted, however, the Delaware Supreme Court has recently 
pronounced that so-called “duty to monitor” cases such as Aronson and Caremark,
widely thought to be due care cases, are really good faith/loyalty cases.  See infra Part 
III.B.1.b.   
56 For a case that is sometimes cited in support of lesser fiduciary duty standards 
for outside directors, see Rowen v. Le Mars Mutual Ins. Co. of Iowa, 282 N.W.2d 639, 
652 (Iowa 1979) (subjecting outside directors to lesser fiduciary duty standards because 
“an outside director does not have the same duty or responsibility that falls upon those 
who are in active charge and who dictate day-to-day policy”). 
57 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 141(e): 
A member of the board of directors, or a member of any committee 
designated by the board of directors, shall, in the performance of such 
member's duties, be fully protected in relying in good faith upon the 
records of the corporation and upon such information, opinions, reports 
or statements presented to the corporation by any of the corporation's 
officers or employees, or committees of the board of directors, or by 
any other person as to matters the member reasonably believes are 
within such other person's professional or expert competence and who 
has been selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the 
corporation. 
58 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42. 
59 Id. at *29, n. 54.   
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Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, recently opined that “[i]t would be 
a perversity of corporate governance goals, in my view, for the Delaware 
courts to announce a general rule that a director with special expertise is 
more exposed to liability than other directors solely because of her status 
as an expert.”60 Justice Jacobs’ more stringent treatment of financial 
expert Mouio in Emerging Communications appears to be an exception to 
this general rule,61 although that opinion can be read to call into question 
Mouio’s good faith due to his expert status rather than alter his standard of 
care.62 (If the latter reading is correct, it also supports an individual focus 
in good faith cases.)  Whether there should be an expert/non-expert 
distinction has been the topic of recent discussion, particularly as it relates 
to audit committees.63 
If courts wished to account for the differences among directors in 
assessing due care compliance, we would expect to them to draw 
distinctions based on inside/outside director status and expert/non-expert 
qualifications.  The fact that courts are not routinely drawing these 
distinctions suggests that they deem a collective focus appropriate in duty 
of care cases.   
 
60 Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 50, at 1446. 
61 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.   
62 This is how Chief Justice Veasey appears to read Emerging Communications.
In discussing Mouio’s liability, he states:   
When purporting to rely on another expert in a transaction where a 
director knows that the expert’s opinion is questionable, the director 
could be at greater risk of liability than the other directors.  This is not 
because of the director’s status as an expert.  It is simply that a director 
with such expertise cannot rely in good faith on another expert’s 
particular opinions under section 141(e). 
Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 50, at 1446. 
63 The SEC has come out against a heightened standard of liability for financial 
experts on audit committees.  See Exchange Act Release No. 47,235 [2002-2003 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec L. Rep. (CCH) P 86,818, at 86,894 (Jan. 23, 2003) (“Our new rule 
provides that whether a person is, or is not, an audit committee financial expert does not 
alter his or her duties, obligations or liabilities…under federal or state law.”)  For 
conflicting views on whether audit committee members should be held to a higher 
standard of care, compare Jill E. Fisch and Caroline M. Gentile, The Qualified Legal 
Compliance Committee:  Using the Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of 
Directors, 53 DUKE L.J. 517, 572 (2003) (asking “[i]f, as the Commission's safe harbor 
suggests, audit committee members do not face increased liability exposure, is it realistic 
to expect them to play an active role?”) with Kevin Iurato, Comment: Warning!  A 
Position on the Audit Committee Could Mean Greater Exposure to Liability:  The 
Problems with Applying a Heightened Standard of Care to the Corporate Audit 
Committee, 30 STETSON L. REV. 977 (2001). 
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C.  Relevant Statutory Provisions 
 
1.  Delaware General Corporation Law § 144 
Finally, two important statutory provisions on fiduciary duties add to 
our body of existing law addressing the individual/collective question.  
The first is Delaware General Corporation Law Section 144, which speaks 
to the duty of loyalty and holds that certain transactions are not void solely 
because of “1 or more” directors’ self-dealing.64 The mechanisms that can 
save a self-dealing transaction from automatic voidability are:  (1) 
disclosure of the conflict followed by the approval of disinterested 
directors; (2) disclosure of the conflict followed by the approval of 
shareholders; or (3) a judicial determination that the transaction was fair to 
the corporation.65 If the transaction cannot be saved through these 
mechanisms, the self-dealing director owes damages in an amount equal to 
the “unfairness” of the transaction, a measure usually based on rescission 
or restitution.66 
Section 144’s use of the language “1 or more” to modify directors 
makes clear that even one director’s self-dealing forms the basis for 
greater judicial scrutiny of the transaction, and potentially for liability.  
Consequently, it supports the case law’s preference for an individual 
director focus in duty of loyalty cases. 
 
2.  Model Business Corporation Act § 8.30 
Although this article focuses on Delaware law, the Model Business 
Corporation Act (MBCA) has been enacted in some form by a majority of 
states and therefore constitutes an important source of corporate law.67 
64 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 144(a).  
65 See ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, 167-70 (1986) (discussing these 
mechanisms but noting that disclosure plus either disinterested director approval or 
shareholder approval does not mean that a court cannot also inquire into entire fairness).  
In the past, interested director transactions were automatically voidable by the 
corporation regardless of whether they had been disclosed, approved, or were fair to the 
corporation.  See Harold Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?  Conflict of Interest and 
Corporate Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35, 35 (1966). 
66 CLARK, supra note 65, at 175 (“For example, when an officer sells property at an 
unfair, inflated price to his corporation, he becomes liable for the difference between the 
actual price and the fair value of the property.”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law 
and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1276 (1999) (“Generally speaking, the legal 
sanctions for violating the duty of loyalty are inefficiently low.  The primary legal 
sanctions are rescission and restitution.”).  See also Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 
663 A.2d 1134, 1147-1150 (Del. Ch. 1994), aff’d. 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995); 
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983). 
67 See Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 50, at 1417 (“Although Delaware is 
not a Model Act state, it is sometimes helpful to learn from the articulation of the 
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After its 1998 revision, the MBCA was clear in its preference for a 
collective focus on the directors in duty of care cases.68 MBCA Section 
8.30 speaks to the duty of care as a standard of conduct.69 The official 
comment to that section reads “[w]hile certain aspects [of a director’s 
performance] will involve individual conduct (e.g., preparation for 
meetings), these functions are generally performed by the board through 
collegial action.”70 Gordon Smith remarks that the revisions “took further 
pains to subordinate the concept of care, placing it in a separate provision 
whose wording was intended to suggest that care primarily is a concern of 
the board as a separate institution, not the individual director.”71 Jeffrey 
Bauman, Elliott Weiss, and Alan Palmiter also note the MBCA’s sharp 
focus on the whole board:  
 
A significant change in the amended MBCA § 8.30… is the 
emphasis on the board as a collective decision-making 
body….The Official Comment to MBCA § 
8.30…emphasizes that in evaluating board actions, it will 
be the conduct of the entire board rather than a particular 
director that will be most important.72 
In sum, while Van Gorkom and Disney do not say much about how 
courts view the individual/collective question in duty of care cases, the 
case law that implicitly addresses the question suggests a preference for a 
collective focus.  In addition, although there is no statutory provision 
 
corporate law in the MBCA.  The MBCA is followed in varying forms by a majority of 
the states….”). 
68 For a discussion of the 1998 revisions, see R. Franklin Balotti and Joseph 
Hinsey IV, Director Care, Conduct, and Liability:  The Model Business Corporation Act 
Solution, 56 BUS. LAW. 35 (2000). 
69 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (MBCA) § 8.30(b): 
The members of the board of directors or a committee of the board, 
when becoming informed in connection with their decision-making 
function or devoting attention to their oversight function, shall 
discharge their duties with the care that a person in a like position 
would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances. 
The standard of liability is found in § 8.31.  For the difference between standards 
of conduct and standards of liability, see infra notes 173-181 and accompanying text. 
70 § 8.30(b) cmt. 
71 D. Gordon Smith, A Proposal to Eliminate Director Standards from the Model 
Business Corporation Act, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1201, 1213 (1999). 
72 JEFFREY D. BAUMAN ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY: MATERIAL AND 
PROBLEMS 673 (5th ed. 2003).   
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similar to MBCA § 8.30 in Delaware,73 the MBCA provision further 
reveals a preference for a collective focus in duty of care cases. 
 
III 
ANSWERING THE INDIVIDUAL/COLLECTIVE QUESTION ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE POLICY GROUNDS 
The previous Part observed that courts have answered the question 
of individual or collective liability for directors differently depending on 
the type of fiduciary duty at issue.  This Part asks whether this duty-based 
approach – which treats loyalty breaches individually and due care 
breaches collectively – can be defended on corporate governance policy 
grounds.  More specifically, it asks whether this duty-based approach will 
improve board functioning.  Because the courts’ approach strikes the right 
balance between a board’s authority and accountability, and because it 
furthers the deterrence and compensation goals underlying fiduciary duty 
suits, this Part concludes that a duty-based approach is normatively 
desirable. 
 
A.  Normative Criteria for Promoting a Well-Functioning Board 
 
1.  Board’s Authority/Accountability Balance 
Drawing on the work of Nobel laureate economist Kenneth Arrow,74 
Stephen Bainbridge has stated that the balance between a board’s authority 
and its accountability is what “all of corporate law” is intended to 
achieve.75 On the one hand, the board has almost complete authority over 
corporate affairs pursuant to the laws of Delaware and every other state.76 
In theory, shareholders retain some control rights – most notably the right 
to elect directors, amend corporate bylaws, and approve certain major 
transactions – but even these rights are severely limited in practice.77 The 
 
73 See Smith, supra note 71, at 1227 (“It is worth remembering that Delaware does 
not have a statutory provision prescribing the duty of care.”). 
74 KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974). 
75 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 83, 84 (2004) (“My analysis is grounded on the core proposition that the 
business judgment rule, like all of corporate law, is designed to effect a compromise – on 
a case-by-case basis – between two competing values: authority and accountability.  
These values refer, respectively, to the need to preserve the board of directors' decision-
making discretion and the need to hold the board accountable for its decisions.”) (citation 
omitted).  For an earlier discussion of Arrow’s work, see D. Gordon Smith, Corporate 
Governance and Managerial Incompetence:  Lessons from Kmart, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1037, 
1119 (1996). 
76 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 141. 
77 For instance, although shareholders have the right to elect directors, they must 
choose from management’s nominees or instigate a proxy fight.  Similarly, although 
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board’s wide authority is acknowledged to be “essential for organizational 
efficiency” given the separation of ownership and control in public 
corporations.78 On the other hand, the board must exercise its authority 
responsibly, as directors who serve their own interests rather than the 
interests of shareholders do not increase shareholder wealth.  Fiduciary 
duties are one way of holding directors accountable to shareholders, 
thereby reducing agency costs.79 Accountability, whether imposed 
through fiduciary duty law or some other means, serves as the competing 
principle to authority, and “one cannot have more of one without also 
having less of the other.”80 The pertinent question, then, is where do we 
draw the line between authority and accountability to achieve optimal 
balance?81 
In fiduciary duty litigation, the answer may seem simple:  hold 
directors accountable only if they breach their fiduciary duties, otherwise 
respect their authority.  But the matter is more complicated when the 
individual/collective question presents itself – i.e., when some directors 
breach and others do not.  Employing an individual focus and holding only 
the breachers liable does not produce optimal results in all cases.  Instead, 
the choice between an individual or collective focus should be informed 
by the adequacy of the board’s decisionmaking process.82 The goal, after 
 
shareholders have the right to approve certain major transactions, such as the sale of the 
corporation, any such action must first be instigated by the board.  See Bainbridge, supra 
note 2, at 568-573.  Given this reality, some corporate law scholars argue in favor of 
increased power for shareholders.  See Lucian Ayre Bebchuck, The Case for Increasing 
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005); LUCIAN BEBCHUK AND JESSE FRIED,
PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 201-16 (2004); Robert B. Thompson and D. Gordon 
Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role:  “Sacred Space” in Corporate 
Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261 (2001).   
78 Bainbridge, supra note 75, at 107.  
79 Although directors are not technically agents and shareholders are not 
technically principals, the agency theory of the firm has “dominated corporate legal 
scholarship for at least two decades.”  Thompson and Smith, supra note 77, at 268.  For 
the argument that the corporate law literature has overemphasized the importance of 
agency costs, see Robert K. Rasmussen and Douglas G. Baird, The Prime Directive, draft 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=930187.
80 Id. at 103. 
81 This question was the subject of an online debate between Gordon Smith and 
Stephen Bainbridge in September 2006, although that debate was concerned with 
increased shareholder participation in corporate governance rather than fiduciary duty 
litigation.  See http://www.pointoflaw.com/feature/ (last visited September 23, 2006). 
82 Corporate law tends to focus on the board’s decisionmaking process rather than 
the substantive decision that results from that process.  Consider corporate law’s most 
ubiquitous tenet, the business judgment rule.  Under the business judgment rule, if a 
board deliberates in an informed manner and acts in the best interests of the corporation, 
then a negative substantive outcome will not result in director liability.  See In re 
Caremark International, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 968 (1996) (“[t]he 
business judgment rule is process oriented”); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Symposium:  The 
Director’s Duty of Care in Negotiated Dispositions, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 579, 590 
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all, is to promote a well-functioning board that will make wealth-
enhancing decisions.  If a single director’s breach jeopardizes that goal, is 
it not appropriate to account for that?  Similarly, if a single director’s 
breach does not jeopardize that goal, is it not appropriate to take that into 
consideration as well? 
Accordingly, the authority/accountability line should be drawn 
between board processes that are likely to be adequate – i.e., where we 
have reasonable confidence that a fiduciary duty breach did not effect the 
board’s outcome – and those that are not.  If the board’s process is likely 
to be adequate, we should respect the board’s authority through judicial 
restraint.  But if the board’s process is likely to be inadequate, we should 
favor director accountability through judicial intervention.  It is critical to 
draw the line in the proper place.  Favoring accountability too often would 
diminish the efficiency benefits of centralized decisionmaking.  Too much 
intrusion into the board’s process and too high an incidence of director 
liability can chill director risk-taking and dissuade outside directors from 
serving on boards.83 However, favoring authority too often would give 
directors little incentive to engage in good decisionmaking.84 Some threat 
of intrusion and the imposition of director liability can serve to induce 
better fiduciary duty behavior, and also award compensation to aggrieved 
shareholders when warranted.85 Striking the right balance between 
authority and accountability in fiduciary duty litigation is essential to 
ensuring a well-functioning board,86 and the individual/collective question 
speaks directly to that balance.  
 
(1997) (“The sharp differentiation between the standards of review of the quality of board 
decisions on the one hand, and the decisionmaking process on the other, may be seen as a 
special case of a recurrent legal tendency to review procedure much more intensively 
than substance.”). 
83 This is commonly thought to be the effect of Van Gorkom, and why the 
Delaware legislature responded by eviscerating the duty of care in its aftermath.  See 
Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong With Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance,
14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1989).  See also Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability,
58 STAN. L. REV. 1059 (2006) (“Regardless of one’s position on the [desirability of 
outside director liability]…all would agree that, beyond some level of liability risk, 
qualified people may decide not to serve as directors and that those who do serve may 
become excessively cautious.  Too much fear of liability, therefore, may reduce rather 
than enhance the quality of board decisions.”). 
84 This assumes that non-legal sanctions alone cannot adequately police director 
misbehavior, a claim that some academics would dispute.  See supra note 8.   
85 See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 6, at 395 (“legal liability represents an essential 
mechanism for ensuring directors' fidelity to their fiduciary duties”). 
86 See Lyman Johnson, After Enron:  Remembering Loyalty Discourse in 
Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 27 (2003):   
In a post-Enron world of corporate governance scandal and calls for 
reform, fiduciary duty law presents, as a policy matter, a possible state 
law-based approach for attaining greater director accountability. The 
wisdom of doing so will depend, in part, on whether the risk of greater 
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Of the two approaches, the individual approach favors accountability 
over authority by allowing greater judicial intrusion into the boardroom.  It 
allows courts to rebut the presumptions of the business judgment rule and 
engage in more extensive review of a board’s process, possibly imposing 
director liability, based on a fiduciary duty breach by even one director.  
Because it shifts authority from boards to judges, the individual approach 
should be reserved for cases where a sole director’s fiduciary duty breach 
is harmful enough to meaningfully taint the board’s process and shake our 
confidence in the resulting outcome.  In other words, an individual focus is 
appropriate where a sole director’s actions are sufficiently grave to 
jeopardize the functioning of the whole board.  In practice, the breaching 
director is the only director who faces liability. 
The collective approach, on the other hand, favors authority over 
accountability by deferring to the board’s process.  It only allows for 
judicial intervention and director liability in cases where a significant 
number of directors have breached their fiduciary duties.  Because it 
allows a single director’s fiduciary breach to go unaccounted for, the 
collective approach should be reserved for cases where that breach is not 
harmful enough to meaningfully taint the board’s process and shake our 
confidence in the resulting outcome.  In other words, a collective focus is 
appropriate where the board functions adequately despite the wrongdoing 
or lapse of an individual director. 
Courts could, of course, use the collective approach to impose 
liability on the full board for the wrongdoing of even a single director, 
thereby enticing outside directors to more carefully monitor inside 
directors.87 Daryl Levinson has argued that collective sanctions of this 
kind “make functional sense when group members have the capacity to 
monitor and control the behavior of some intuitively primary wrongdoer 
more efficiently than an external sanctioner.”88 Levinson notes that 
 
financial exposure will induce enhanced discharge of director 
responsibilities, to the advantage of shareholders, or dissuade capable 
prospective director candidates from service, to the detriment of 
shareholders. 
87 The use of outside directors as monitors firmly established as corporate 
governance policy.  In the wake of recent corporate scandals, the perceived importance of 
outside directors has received even more attention than in the past.  See James D. Cox, 
Symposium:  Lessons from Enron, How Did Corporate and Securities Law Fail?  
Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest:  Empowering the Outside Directors with 
Independent Counsel, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1077, 1078 (2003) (“It is safe to say that 
expectations for the independent director have never been higher than they are today.”); 
Fisch, supra note 3 (discussing managerial vs. monitoring boards); Sale, supra note 52 
(SEC now envisions a heightened role for independent directors as securities monitors).  
See also supra note 53 (rationale behind using outside directors as monitors). 
88 Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 426 (2003).  See 
also Note, Collective Sanctions and Large Law Firm Discipline, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2336 
(2005); CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY 162 (2000) (“I suggest that those who 
contribute to collective acts on an ongoing basis will fall into the category of intentional 
participants so long as they see themselves as part of a collective act, and whether or not 
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vicarious liability and joint and several liability are based on the idea of 
collective sanctions.89 Although collective sanctions are an interesting 
theoretical possibility in fiduciary duty litigation, they have not been 
widely used.  Courts do not typically impose fiduciary liability on a full 
board for an individual director’s breach.   
In a recent empirical study, Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins, and 
Michael Klausner found only three cases in the past 25 years, including 
Van Gorkom, where outside directors made out-of-pocket payments for 
fiduciary duty breaches.90 This low incidence of outside director liability 
is partially because, Van Gorkom notwithstanding, less-culpable outside 
directors do tend to shield more-culpable inside directors from liability.91 
Under the collective approach, non-breaching directors tend to protect 
breaching directors rather than vice versa.  Therefore, a collective focus is 
not used to impose accountability through collective sanctions, but instead 
to reinforce the board’s authority. 
 
2.  The Deterrence and Compensation Goals Underlying Fiduciary Duty 
Suits 
If achieving the proper balance between a board’s authority and its 
accountability is the ideal in corporate governance, then it should have the 
most to say about our answer to the individual/collective question.  
However, fiduciary duty litigation is a particular subset of corporate 
 
they favor the collective goal.  If so, they are subject to the inclusive ascription of 
collective acts.”). 
89 Levinson, supra note 88, at 362-370. 
90 See Black et al., supra note 83, at 1055 (empirical study finding that outside 
directors of public companies have made personal payments in only thirteen cases in the 
last twenty-five years, and only three of these thirteen case involved state law fiduciary 
duties).  The authors did not count Emerging Communications, which, if outside director 
Muoio ended up making an out-of-pocket payment, would make the fourth case. 
91 Outside/independent directors provide other legal benefits as well.  A board’s 
decision not to pursue a derivative action after demand, or a special litigation 
committee’s decision to dismiss a suit after demand futility, is more likely to be protected 
by the business judgment rule if directors are disinterested and independent.  See Aronson 
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) (on demand futility); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 
430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (on special litigation committees).  Also, “the Delaware courts 
have held that the decisions of boards with a majority of outside directors are entitled to 
certain beneficial presumptions.”  Pease, supra note 55, at 35 (citing Puma v. Marriott,
283 A.2d 693 (1971), and takeover cases from the 1980s); see also Ivanhoe v. Newport 
Mining Co., 535 A.2d 1334, 1343 (Del. 1987) (“with the independent directors in the 
majority, proof that the board acted in good faith and upon reasonable investigation is 
materially enhanced”); Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate 
Governance Mechanism:  Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 963 (1996) 
(“courts may be more inclined to approve the board’s actions if the board was composed 
of a majority of independent outside directors”); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, Independent 
Directors and Stock Market Prices:  The New Corporate Governance Paradigm, draft 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=928100.
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governance, and the American Law Institute (ALI) identifies two specific 
goals for this litigation that must also be examined.  First, fiduciary duty 
litigation is intended to deter against fiduciary duty breaches ex ante; 
second, it is intended to compensate for the losses those breaches cause ex 
post.92 While these goals have been delineated separately from the 
authority/accountability balance, the following discussion shows that they 
ultimately inform that balance rather than compete with it. 
 
a.  Deterrence 
The deterrence of director wrongdoing is thought to be a stronger 
rationale for allowing fiduciary duty suits than compensation.93 The U.S. 
Supreme Court has remarked that even in cases where it “may be 
impossible to assign monetary value to the benefit,” fiduciary duty 
litigation can “render a substantial service to the corporation and its 
shareholders.”94 It may be that fiduciary duty litigation itself is a weak 
 
92 ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Introduction, Part VII, 
Reporter’s Note 2 (1992) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES] (“As with other forms of tort 
actions, the derivative’s action’s principal goals are deterrence and compensation.”).  
Although the ALI Principles discuss fiduciary litigation that takes the form of a 
derivative suit, these suits have now taken a backseat to shareholder class actions.  See 
Robert B. Thompson and Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Face of Derivative 
Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1762 (2004) (in Delaware in 1999 and 2000, 824 
fiduciary duty suits were in the form of class actions, while only 137 were derivative 
suits).  This is probably due to the derivative suit’s demand requirement and the mergers 
and acquisitions context in which these suits frequently arise, where shareholders can 
claim a direct injury.  Id. at 1762.  But the difference between derivative suits and class 
actions is of little consequence to the discussion at hand – the goals underlying derivative 
suits apply more or less equally to class actions.  See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra, at 13 
(deterrence rationale for derivative suits “applies as well to the context of shareholder 
litigation”). 
93 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 92, Reporter’s Note at 16 (“if meritorious 
derivative actions seeking to enforce legal rules that protect all shareholders could be 
easily terminated simply by showing that they would not yield a positive net recovery, 
average agency costs might rise…”); James D. Cox, American Law Institute’s Corporate 
Governance Project:  Remedies:  Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as 
Boundaries for Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745 (1984): 
In two important areas, the proposal to the ALI makes deterrence 
paramount over a compensatory objective.  First, although defendants 
can usually avoid liability by establishing that their misconduct created 
a net benefit to the corporation, the proposal disallows such a defense if 
the court believes the defense ‘would frustrate an authoritatively 
established public policy.’  Second, courts in their review of a dismissal 
recommendation of a special litigation committee must find that 
‘dismissal of the action would not frustrate any authoritatively 
established public policy.’ 
But see Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 
703 (1974). 
94 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970). 
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deterrent compared with market and other non-legal forces acting on 
directors.95 The deterrent effect of fiduciary duty suits is certainly reduced 
by the availability of indemnification and D&O insurance, which serve to 
protect certain breaching directors from making personal payments.96 
Nevertheless, the threat of fiduciary liability is thought to play some role 
in deterring director wrongdoing, thereby reducing agency costs between 
shareholders and directors.97 Consequently, some courts have allowed 
these suits to proceed even when damages are unavailable.98 
The individual and collective approaches vary in their deterrent 
effect.  The individual approach aims deterrence at each director on the 
board and penalizes even a single director’s transgression.  Consequently, 
the individual approach provides a harsh form of deterrence.  It should 
therefore be reserved for cases where it is necessary for every director to 
act, or avoid acting, in a particular manner to ensure a reliable 
 
95 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 92, Introductory Note at 5 (“the derivative 
action is neither the initial nor the primary protection for shareholders against managerial 
misconduct.  A variety of social and market forces also operate to hold corporate officials 
accountable”). 
96 Indemnification is available provided the directors have acted in good faith and 
in the best interests of the corporation.  Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 145 (limited permissive 
indemnification to amounts paid by a director “if such person acted in good faith and in a 
manner such person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of 
the corporation”).  See also Karl E. Strauss, Indemnification in Delaware:  Balancing 
Policy Goals and Liabilities, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 143 (2004).  D&O insurance, which 
almost all public corporations have, provides a further backstop against personal liability.  
Because there are no limits imposed by corporate or securities laws on the scope of 
coverage, see Black et al., supra note 83, at 1085, D&O insurance should be able to fill 
any holes left by good faith exclusions in indemnification.  Id. at 1094 (“even outside 
directors whose oversight failure is so extreme as to meet the good faith standard may 
still be covered by D&O insurance to the extent of the policy limit….D&O policies 
exclude from coverage conduct that constitutes deliberate fraud or the taking of illegal 
profits.  These exclusions are narrower than the conscious disregard of duty conception of 
good faith”). 
97 See, e.g., Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS 
AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55 (1985) (fiduciary duties can reduce 
agency costs); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. 
REV. 621, 638 (2004) (“liability rules such as fiduciary duties…[are] devices for 
minimizing agency costs”). 
98 See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 NE 2d 910, 912 (NY 1969): 
It is true that the complaint before us does not contain any allegation of 
damages to the corporation but this never has been considered to be an 
essential requirement for a cause of action founded on breach of 
fiduciary duty….This is because the function of such an action, unlike 
an ordinary tort or contract case, is not merely to compensate the 
plaintiffs for wrongs committed by the defendant but…‘to prevent 
them, by removing from agents and trustees all inducement to attempt 
dealing for their own benefit in matters which they have undertaken for 
others, or to which their agency or trust relates.’  
(citation omitted). 
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decisionmaking process.  Of course, it is always desirable for each 
director to comply with her fiduciary duties, but a balance must be 
maintained between properly deterring and overdeterring to the point 
where directors do not take risks or want to serve on boards.99 Again the 
goal of corporate law generally, and of the choice of assessment approach 
specifically, is to maintain the balance between a board’s authority and its 
accountability.  By favoring accountability, the individual approach may 
provide optimal deterrence in some cases but not in others. 
The collective approach, on the other hand, aims deterrence at the 
board as a whole.  If courts used this approach as a collective sanction – to 
penalize the whole board for the acts of individual directors – it could 
serve as a harsh form of deterrence aimed at outside directors who fail to 
monitor inside directors.  As noted earlier, however, the collective 
approach does not operate as a collective sanction.100 Instead, by 
requiring multiple breaches for judicial intervention, the collective 
approach is a weak form of deterrence that is appropriate where we worry 
about overdeterrence, and where we have confidence in the board’s 
decisionmaking process if most directors comply with their fiduciary 
duties.  The collective approach strikes the authority/accountability 
balance in favor of a board’s authority, assuming less of a need for 
accountability. 
 
b.  Compensation 
The other goal of fiduciary duty suits – compensation – functions as 
a less-important rationale than deterrence if we accept the conventional 
wisdom that holding directors to account provides minimal economic 
benefits to shareholders, with plaintiff’s attorneys being the primary 
economic beneficiaries.101 Whether or not the conventional wisdom is 
 
99 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 92, Introductory Note at 8 (the ALI seeks “to steer a 
middle course between excessive reliance on litigation remedies and the abolition of any 
judicial recourse for the shareholder,” and “is particularly sensitive to the danger of 
overdeterrence and the impact of even the potential risk of litigation on the willingness of 
outside directors to serve and on their conduct as directors”).  See also supra note 83 and 
accompanying text. 
100 See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text. 
101 For a critique of the plaintiff’s attorney’s role in shareholder litigation, see 
Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO.
L. J. 1733, 1734 n. 5 (1994) (collecting sources).  But see Thompson and Thomas, supra 
note 92, at 1749-50 (“roughly 30 percent of the derivative suits provide relief to the 
corporation or the shareholders, while the others are usually dismissed quickly with little 
apparent litigation activity.  In cases producing a recovery to shareholders, the amount of 
recovery typically exceeds the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded by a significant 
margin”); Thomas M. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder 
Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U. L. REV. 542 (1980) (plaintiff shareholders 
obtained recovery in approximately 75% of cases, but whether recovery exceeded costs 
of litigation was not measured).  Shareholders prefer class actions to derivative suits as a 
means of compensation, as any sums recovered derivatively go back to the corporate 
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correct, the choice between an individual and collective focus impacts the 
likelihood of compensation.  The individual director approach provides the 
most robust means of compensation, as even a single director’s fiduciary 
duty breach can trigger a recovery.  The recovery is not diminished 
because it comes from a single director, as breaching directors are jointly 
and severally liable for a plaintiff’s entire loss.102 The collective 
approach, on the other hand, makes compensation less likely by requiring 
a greater number of breaching directors to trigger recovery.  As with 
deterrence, a court’s choice between the two approaches should seek to 
appropriately compensate without overcompensating.  To achieve this 
balance, courts should select the individual approach and award 
compensation in cases where a single director’s breach is likely to be the 
proximate cause of a loss, but select the collective approach and deny 
compensation in cases where a single director’s breach is unlikely to have 
led to the loss.103 
B.  Application of Normative Criteria to Fiduciary Duty Claims 
 
1.  Duty of Loyalty 
a.  Self-Dealing 
Applying these normative criteria to the different types of fiduciary 
duty claims that may be brought reveals support for the courts’ answer to 
the individual/collective question based on fiduciary duty type.  In 
choosing between the individual and collective approaches, classic duty of 
loyalty claims present the most straightforward analysis.  As a general 
 
coffers, with shareholders compensated only indirectly through a pro rata increase in the 
value of their shares.  See Thompson and Thomas, supra note 92, at 1758. 
102 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (imposing joint and several liability on all 
Trans Union directors); In re Emerging Communications, 2004 WL 1305745, at *43 (“In 
the fiduciary duty action, defendants…are jointly and severally liable the plaintiff 
class….”); Trieweiler v. Sears, 689 NW2d 807, 835 (Neb. 2004) (based on the principle 
that co-agents are jointly and severally liable, “it has been held that directors and officers 
of a corporation are jointly and severally liable if they jointly participate in a breach of 
fiduciary duty”); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Block, 924 SW2d 354, 355 (Tenn 1996) 
(“While officers and directors’ liability to the corporation has been attributed to various 
legal theories, it has been unanimously recognized that officer and director liability to the 
corporation for their collective actions is joint and several.”) (citation omitted).   
103 Technically, only the board can cause a loss because no single director has the 
power to take action on behalf of the corporation.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 14C cmt. b (“An individual director…has no power of his own to act on the 
corporation’s behalf, but only as one of the body of directors acting as a board.”).  
However, the duty-of-loyalty rules essentially circumvent the board’s role in the case of 
an undisclosed conflict-of-interest.  If a single director has an undisclosed conflict, the 
only question is fairness.  If a transaction is unfair, then only the single director is liable.  
This suggests that the single director is viewed as the proximate cause of the loss in such 
cases. 
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matter, a director breaches his duty of loyalty when he approves a 
corporate action that benefits himself at the shareholders’ expense (so-
called “self-dealing” transactions).  For purposes of answering the 
individual/collective question, there are three things to note about self-
dealing.  First, it is intentional rather than negligent conduct.  Second, it is 
typically done by inside directors, who may try to use their management 
positions and more intimate knowledge about the corporation to gain a 
personal benefit.  Third, according to conventional wisdom, at least, these 
inside directors are likely to enjoy board capture, meaning that outside 
directors are likely to rubberstamp any recommendations the insiders 
make.104 When these three things are combined, it is clear that self-
dealing has the potential to taint the board’s decisionmaking process in a 
meaningful way – toward the self-dealing director’s ends and away from 
the shareholders’ ends.105 Therefore, it is appropriate to favor 
accountability over authority in these situations to ensure a functional 
board.  An individual approach allows courts to engage in more extensive 
review of the board’s process or the transaction’s substantive merits, and 
to impose liability on disloyal directors in unfair transactions.   
CEO Prosser’s conduct in Emerging Communications provides a 
good illustration of why an individual focus is appropriate in self-dealing 
cases.106 Prosser engaged in self-dealing by scrapping a merger and 
instead pushing a privatization, a transaction from which he “‘derived an 
improper personal benefit’.”107 Because he would reap a personal 
financial benefit from the privatization, Prosser had motive to induce the 
board to vote his way without adequate consideration of the shareholders’ 
 
104 See CLARK, supra note 65, at 183 (detailing reasons why other directors might 
be beholden to the CEO); Bainbridge, supra note 75, at 105 (“In practice, of course, 
many boards of directors are captured by the firm’s senior management and simply 
rubberstamp managerial decisions.”); In re: Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 2005 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *191 (“Eisner stacked his (and I intentionally write ‘his’ as 
opposed to ‘the Company’s’) board of directors with friends and other acquaintances 
who, though no necessarily beholden to him in a legal sense, were certainly more willing 
to accede to his wishes and support him unconditionally”).  Post-Sarbanes-Oxley, 
however, this tendency to rubberstamp may be lessening.  See “Why Corporate 
Boardrooms Are in Turmoil,” Wall St. J., September 16, 2006, p. A7 (“Corporate boards, 
which once served largely as rubber stamps for powerful CEOs, have become more 
independent, more powerful, and under more pressure to dump leaders who perform 
poorly.”). 
105 See Jennifer M. Johnson and Mary Siegel, Corporate Mergers:  Redefining the 
Role of Target Directors, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 315, 378 (1987) (“In merger approval cases, 
the directors' unavoidable conflict of interest may taint their actions and 
recommendations, thus undermining the effective operation of the structural and market 
monitors.”); Karl F. Balz, No-Shop Clauses, 28 DEL. J. CORP. 513, 559-61 (2003) 
(discussing the harmful taint of disloyalty on the part of target company directors). 
106 See supra Part II.A.2. 
107 2004 WL 1305745, at *39.   
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interests.  Because he was an inside director who enjoyed board capture,108 
the board went along with his proposal.  The Emerging Communications 
board did not function properly because a single director was disloyal. 
Deterrence and compensation are also properly aimed at individual 
directors in self-dealing cases.  Recall that by penalizing even a single 
director’s fiduciary duty breach, the individual approach provides a stricter 
form of deterrence and a more likely means of compensation than does the 
collective approach.  Assuming that intentional actors are more deterrable 
than negligent ones,109 a stricter form of deterrence is appropriate for self-
dealing.  Likewise, given that the law favors harsher financial penalties for 
intentional actors than for negligent ones,110 a greater likelihood of 
damages is appropriate for disloyalty.  Further, overdeterrence and 
overcompensation are less of a concern for intentional wrongs such as 
self-dealing, particularly because a director’s disloyalty does not 
automatically result in liability.  As an initial matter, it serves only to rebut 
the presumptions of the business judgment rule and trigger judicial 
scrutiny of a challenged transaction.  The law’s saving mechanisms, 
particularly entire fairness, will help keep deterrence and compensation in 
check when courts apply the individual approach in self-dealing cases.111 
If liability is ultimately assessed, typically the penalty will only be 
disgorgement of the ill-gotten gains.112 
b.  Good Faith 
The precise nature of good faith has been in flux in the Delaware 
courts for some time now.  Before the Delaware Supreme Court took up 
the issue in Disney and most recently Stone v. Ritter,113 it was unclear 
whether good faith was inextricably tied to the duty of loyalty, the duty of 
care, or whether it constituted a third, independent fiduciary duty on equal 
footing with the other two.  Support had been found for each of these 
 
108 Id. (noting that none of the other directors were independent of Prosser). 
109 See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost and Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back:  A 
Critique of the Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV. 239, 
295 (1999) (“Where…the law imposes criminal or civil penalties on intentional 
conduct…complete deterrence is the proper goal.  An intentional actor, by definition, acts 
with more deliberation and therefore should be more deterrable than a negligent actor.”).  
But see GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, 133-73 (1970) (“Negligent, no 
less than intentional, wrongs are fit subjects for deterrence.”); Donald C. Langevoort, 
Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853, 869 (1995) (suggesting that the 
egos of corporate managers can cause them to underestimate the risks or the 
wrongfulness of their actions, thereby weakening the deterrent value of legal sanctions). 
110 See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 30-31 (4th ed. 1971) 
(greater liability is imposed on the intentional tortfeasor than on the negligent one). 
111 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. 
112 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
113 2006 WL 3169168. 
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positions.  For example, Sean Griffith cited several “closely reasoned 
chancery court opinions [that] treat good faith as an aspect of the duty of 
loyalty,” including Emerging Communications.114 Some opinions, 
including the Chancery Court’s opinion in Disney, had been read to 
suggest a good faith/due care interplay.115 And Hillary Sale, most notably, 
argued that recent Delaware decisions laid the groundwork for recognizing 
good faith as an independent fiduciary duty.116 
In Disney, the Delaware Supreme Court appeared to establish good 
faith as an independent fiduciary duty.  The court first noted that, despite 
the recent scholarly writing on the subject, “the duty to act in good faith is, 
up to this point, relatively unchartered.”117 Then it stated that “the 
universe of fiduciary misconduct is not limited to either disloyalty in the 
classic sense…or gross negligence.  A vehicle is needed to address such 
violations doctrinally, and that doctrinal vehicle is the duty to act in good 
faith.”118 Curiously, however, after discussing a duty of good faith and 
what it entailed, the court hedged in a final footnote reading “we do not 
reach or otherwise address the issue of whether the fiduciary duty to act in 
good faith is a duty that, like the duties of care and loyalty, can serve as an 
independent basis for imposing liability upon corporate officers and 
directors.  That issue is not before us on this appeal.”119 
The reason for the court’s hedge became clear in Stone, a decision 
issued less than five months after Disney. In Stone, the court surprisingly 
 
114 Griffith, supra note 38, at 5 n. 11 (citing cases).  See also Johnson, supra note 
86, at 55 (“Delaware courts have branded conduct falling with the second (‘not in good 
faith’) exception [to § 102(b)(7)] as implicating loyalty…”). 
115 Griffith observed that Chancellor Chandler focused on the board’s process in 
approving the Ovitz employment agreement, which is essentially a due care analysis, 
under the rubric of good faith.  Griffith, supra note 38, at 22-23 (“As in Van Gorkom,
such allegations would typically form the basis of the complaint under the duty of care, 
but the court did not pursue this analysis, perhaps because the business judgment rule and 
the 102(b)(7) provision would have kept it from getting very far.”).  Hillary Sale noted 
the good faith/due care interplay in another well-known Delaware case, In re Caremark 
International Inc. Derivative Litigation. Sale, supra note 5, at 467 (“Caremark generated 
considerable discussion as a duty of care case when issued.  It remains an important 
contribution to the perceived standards of care, but arguably is also one of the cases 
discussing good faith explicitly in the context of corporate decisionmaking.”). 
116 See Sale, supra note 5; Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 50, at 1452 
(“Professor Hillary Sale…has concluded rather convincingly that good faith is a separate 
fiduciary duty”).  On the emergence the duty of good faith, see also Eisenberg, supra 
note 5; David H. Cook, The Emergence of Delaware’s Good Faith Fiduciary Duty:  In re 
Emerging Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 91 (2004); 
Tara L. Dunn, The Developing Theory of Good Faith in Director Conduct:  Are 
Delaware Courts Ready to Force Corporate Directors To Go Out-of-Pocket After Disney 
IV, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 531 (2005). 
117 2006 Del. LEXIS 307, *90. 
118 Id.
119 Id. at *102 n. 112.   
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reversed course and, with scant explanation, held that good faith was not 
an independent fiduciary duty, but part of the duty of loyalty.120 Stone 
was interesting in another respect, for not only did it put good faith under 
the loyalty heading, but it put the famous Caremark “duty to monitor” 
case,121 which was widely seen as a subset of the duty of care,122 under the 
loyalty heading as well. 
While the good faith jurisprudence of late is somewhat strange, good 
faith as defined by Disney (and affirmed by Stone) does more closely 
resemble the traditional duty of loyalty than the duty of care.123 In Disney,
the Delaware Supreme Court identified at least three types of bad faith 
conduct:  intentionally acting with a purpose other than that of advancing 
the best interests of the corporation, intentionally acting to violate 
applicable positive law, and acting with a conscious and intentional 
disregard of duties.124 The first two categories of subjective bad faith are 
“fiduciary conduct motivated by an actual intent to do harm,”125 to which 
the court remarked “such conduct constitutes classic, quintessential bad 
faith is a proposition so well accepted in the liturgy that it borders on 
axiomatic.”126 The third category, a “conscious and intentional disregard 
of duties,” is a somewhat less obvious type of bad faith, and may have the 
potential to expand the range of proscribed fiduciary conduct.127 
For purposes of the individual/collective question, the most 
important thing to note is that bad faith is currently limited to intentional 
misconduct.128 Some corporate law scholars would critique Disney and 
 
120 2006 WL 3169168, at *6 (“the obligation to act in good faith does not establish 
an independent fiduciary duty” but that the duty of loyalty “encompasses cases where the 
fiduciary fails to act in good faith”). 
121 In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (1996).   
122 See Sale, supra note 5, at 467 (“Caremark generated considerable discussion as 
a duty of due care case when issued” and “remains an important contribution to the 
perceived standards of care”). 
123 In re: Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 2006 Del. LEXIS 307, at __ 
(rejecting a conflation of the duties of good faith and care). 
124 Id. at *99-100. 
125 Id. at *93.   
126 Id.
127 Id. at *100 (“To protect the interests of the corporation and its shareholders, 
fiduciary conduct…which does not involve disloyalty (as traditionally defined) but is 
qualitatively more culpable than gross negligence, should be proscribed.”). 
128 For a post-Disney opinion emphasizing the intentionality requirement in bad 
faith, see ATM-KIM Eng. Financial Corp. v. Araneta, 2006 WL 3783520 (Del. Ch.) at 
*19 (“imposition of liability requires a showing that the directors knew that they were not 
discharging their fiduciary obligations”), and id. at *21 (behavior of two directors who 
failed to monitor inside director and majority shareholder’s self-dealing “was not the 
product of a lapse in attention or judgment; it was the product of the willingness to serve 
the needs of their employer…even when that meant intentionally abandoning the 
important obligations they had taken on”). 
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Stone as defining bad faith too narrowly, and would extend the definition 
to include egregious acts or derelictions of duty that fall short of 
intentional misconduct.129 At least as things stand now, however, the main 
reason for using an individual director approach in classic disloyalty cases 
– the intentional nature of self-dealing – also suggests that the individual 
approach should apply in the new subset of good faith cases.  Because bad 
faith on the part of even one director might inject a harmful bias into the 
board’s decisionmaking process, courts should favor accountability over 
authority, and the stricter form of deterrence and compensation, in good 
faith cases. 
 
2.  Duty of Care 
Duty of care claims present a more difficult choice between the 
individual and collective approaches.130 Legally, acting with due care 
means avoiding gross negligence.131 Practically, it means becoming 
informed, weighing decisions, and consulting with the appropriate 
advisors.132 Despite Delaware’s passage of § 102(b)(7), which allows 
corporations to exculpate directors from personal liability for duty of care 
breaches,133 due care claims may well survive a motion to dismiss and call 
 
129 See Sale, supra note 5, at 493 (“a breach of good faith need not be intentional 
or conscious” but “does require some sort of obvious, deliberate, or egregious failure”); 
Elizabeth Nowicki, The Unimportance of Being Earnest:  Reflections on Director 
Liability and Good Faith, draft available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=921668 (arguing in favor of liability 
for actions that are “not in good faith,” even if such actions do not qualify as “bad faith”).   
130 Although corporate law’s duty of care is commonly described as a fiduciary 
duty, it has been observed that the duty is “not distinctively fiduciary.”  Deborah DeMott, 
Beyond Metaphor:  An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 915 (duty 
of care is “not distinctively fiduciary; many persons, by virtue of the law or their own 
contractual undertakings, owe duties of car to other persons with whom they have 
nonfiduciary relationships”). 
131 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, 162 
(2005) (“duty of care violations are only actionable if the directors acted with gross 
negligence”). 
132 See Sale, supra note 5, at 464-65. 
133 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7).  Under this provision, a certificate of 
incorporation may contain: 
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to 
the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of 
fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not 
eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the 
director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for 
acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional 
misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of this title; 
or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an improper 
personal benefit. 
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for a choice between the individual and collective approaches after trial.  
Current law on 102(b)(7) exculpation allows for dismissal of plaintiff’s 
complaint when only due care violations are raised.134 Therefore, a 
complaint that also alleges disloyalty or bad faith should preserve the 
plaintiff’s case for trial, given that bad faith or disloyalty can rebut the 
protective presumptions of the business judgment rule and void a 
102(b)(7) clause.135 In addition, 102(b)(7) clauses do not preclude a 
choice between the individual and collective approaches in assessing duty 
of care violations for purposes of granting injunctive relief.136 
The lack of due care is a wrong of a different nature than disloyalty 
because it is not intentional.  According to Bainbridge, “loyalty…differ[s] 
in kind, not just in degree, from care….there is a compelling economic 
justification for insulating allegedly negligent board decisions from 
judicial review.  Few components of that justification carry over to self-
dealing or bad faith.  Indeed, the affirmative case for disregarding honest 
errors simply does not apply to intentional misconduct.”137 Likewise, 
Alison Anderson has remarked that disloyalty may be thought of as more 
“unfair” than negligence because it entails a “more deliberate form of self-
 
Most states have passed legislation similar to § 102(b)(7).  See Romano, supra 
note 83, at 30-32 (by 1987, thirty states had passed legislation allowing shareholders to 
opt into similar protections for directors); ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS 
INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: CASES & MATERIALS 
783 (7th ed. 2001) (by 1999, forty-three states has passed such legislation).  Virtually all 
large U.S. corporations have opted in favor of these protections.  See Lawrence A. 
Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477 app. a (1999) 
(finding that in a survey of 100 large U.S. corporations, only 7 did not opt for this 
protection).  But see Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1267-68 (contending that § 102(b)(7) and 
similar provisions have important exceptions). 
134 See Sale, supra note 5, at 467 & n. 62 (citing cases). 
135 Under § 102(b)(7), a certificate of incorporation may not limit or eliminate a 
director’s personal liability for “any breach of the director's duty of loyalty…acts or 
omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing 
violation of law…or…for any transaction from which the director derived an improper 
personal benefit”).  See also Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 50, at 1441-42 (“if 
directors ‘consciously and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities,’ they have not 
acted in good faith and their conduct will not be protected by the business judgment rule 
or by section 102(b)(7)”). 
136 See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (Del. 2001) (duty of care is not 
completely eliminated because a court may still grant injunctive relief if directors acted 
with gross negligence); E. Norman Veasey et al., Delaware Supports Directors With A 
Three-Legged Stool Of Limited Liability, Indemnification and Insurance, 42 BUS. LAW.
399, 403 (1987) (duty of care “will continue to be vitally important in injunction and 
rescission cases and may well be relevant in elections, proxy contests, resignations, and 
removal contexts.”). 
137 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 306 (2002). 
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preference.”138 The Delaware Supreme Court also made this distinction 
clear in Disney, explaining that: 
 
Basic to the common law of torts is the distinction between 
conduct that is negligent (or grossly negligent) and conduct 
that is intentional.  And in the narrower area of corporation 
law, our jurisprudence has recognized the distinction 
between the fiduciary duties to act with due care, with 
loyalty, and in good faith, as well as the consequences that 
flow from that distinction.139 
Whether a director’s wrongdoing is intentional or unintentional has 
important ramifications for the board’s decisionmaking process.  There is 
a more harmful and pervasive quality to a director’s intentional 
wrongdoing than to her carelessness.  Directors acting intentionally have 
motive to subvert the board’s process to win approval of a transaction that 
imbues benefits to themselves, in cases of disloyalty, or allow their fellow 
directors to subvert the process, in some cases of bad faith.140 Directors 
acting negligently, on the other hand, are less likely to even participate in 
the deliberation process given their lack of information about the matters 
under discussion.141 By analogy, it is almost as though the negligent 
director was absent from the board meeting.  Yet majority rule permits 
boards to make decisions and take action without the participation or vote 
 
138 Alison Anderson, Conflicts of Interest:  Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate 
Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738, 758 n. 59 (1978); see also Johnson, supra note 86, at 
60 n. 191 (“The element of deliberateness may, as the vice chancellor [Leo Strine] 
suggests, serve as one partial ‘marker’ for identifying conduct as raising a loyalty issue 
for purposes of sanctioning inappropriate conduct.”). 
139 2006 Del. LEXIS 307, at *99 n. 109.  Recognition that intentional wrongdoing 
is of a different and more-culpable nature than negligence also underlies important 
provisions of U.S. securities law.  See Sale, supra note 5, at 489 (“Scienter is a key 
element of claims pursuant to section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Act and the 
accompanying Rule 10b-5 (’10b-5 claims’).”) (citations omitted). 
140 For instance, in Emerging Communications the court acknowledged that 
attorney/director Raynor may not technically have been disloyal, in the classic self-
dealing sense, because he did not directly profit from the privatization transaction, but his 
complete financial reliance on CEO Prosser – who did directly profit – indicated bad 
faith.  2004 WL 13057445, at *39 and nn.183-84.  Similarly, although financial 
expert/director Muoio was not technically disloyal, neither was he independent of 
Prosser.  The court found that this lack of independence, coupled with the fact that the 
privatization price should have seemed dubious to someone with Muoio’s financial 
expertise, indicated bad faith.  Id. at *39. 
141 Joseph Bonito, a professor of communications who studies participation in 
small groups, makes this observation.  See Joseph A. Bonito, An Information-Processing 
Approach to Participation in Small Groups, 28 COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 275, 279 
(2001) (“the more task-relevant information a member possesses, the greater the 
likelihood that he or she will contribute to the discussion”). 
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of all directors.142 Given majority rule, and assuming that a grossly 
negligent director does little more harm in a meeting through her 
carelessness than an absentee director does through her absence, the 
board’s process is less affected by a single director acting negligently than 
one acting intentionally. 
Another important difference in the due care setting is the status of 
the director likely to engage in the misconduct.  Inside directors are more 
likely to have conflicts of interest because they serve the corporation full-
time to exclusion of other professional pursuits.143 On the other hand, they 
are less likely to be uninformed or otherwise careless given their more 
intimate knowledge of corporate affairs.144 Outside directors present the 
flip side of the coin.  They are less likely to have conflicts of interest, but 
are more likely to be careless given that they devote less attention to the 
corporation.145 Despite recent efforts to make outside directors more 
effective monitors, inside directors continue to enjoy informational and 
other advantages.146 For these reasons, outside directors commonly defer 
to inside directors during deliberations.147 Given that inside directors 
 
142 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 141(b) (“The vote of the majority of the directors 
present at a meeting at which a quorum is present shall be the act of the board of directors 
unless the certificate of incorporation or the by-laws shall require a vote of a greater 
number.”).   
143 See supra note 52 (distinguishing inside and outside directors).  
144 See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?,
in FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 170, 179 (1993) (inside directors are more likely 
to satisfy their duty of care because they own more corporate stock). 
145 See Note, The Limitation of Directors' Liability: A Proposal for Legislative 
Reform, 66 TEX. L. REV. 411, 426 (1987) (“outside directors, who are typically without 
conflicts of interest, must satisfy only a duty of care”). 
146 See Lynne L. Dallas, The Relational Board:  Three Theories of Corporate 
Boards of Directors, 22 J. CORP. L. 1, 4-5 (1996): 
One factor that substantially impedes the conflicts monitoring role of 
the board is the informational dependence of the board on management.  
Managers have expertise and knowledge of corporate affairs and 
opportunities available to the corporation.  They control meeting dates 
and the board's agenda, or the identification of matters to be deliberated 
on by the board.  Managers also have access to various lines of 
communication which permit them to bring the information they 
choose to the board's attention. 
(citation omitted). 
147 See Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law:  A Critical 
Assessment, 43 WM & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1699-1700 (2002) (“by virtue of his or her 
dominant position within the firm, and position as Chairman of the Board, the CEO can 
influence, if not control outright, the selection of inside and outside directors.  Further, 
the CEO and other prominent officers are able to control the direction of the board”). 
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direct the board’s deliberations, their fiduciary duty breaches merit greater 
attention.148 
If due care breaches are less severe in nature because they involve 
silent ignorance on the part of less influential outside directors, as opposed 
to active subversion by more influential inside directors, then we should 
have confidence in a board’s decisionmaking process if most, even if not 
all, directors fulfilled their duty of care.  Accordingly, it would allow too 
much judicial intrusion into the board’s process if consequences were to 
flow from a single director’s carelessness, and therefore courts should 
select the collective approach to assess duty of care claims.  In terms of 
our other normative criteria, aiming deterrence and compensation at 
individual directors in the due care setting would not matter given § 
102(b)(7).149 Because the available remedy for most due care breaches is 
now limited to injunctive relief,150 the fear of personal liability should not 
deter directors from acting carelessly.  Section 102(b)(7) also makes 
compensation for due care breaches much less likely. 
Although the discussion thus far has been limited to how the 
individual and collective approaches strike the board’s 
authority/accountability balance and further the deterrence and 
compensation goals underlying fiduciary duty suits, it is also important to 
consider additional negative effects on the board’s functioning that could 
result from using the individual approach in the due care setting.  The 
consensus-driven decisionmaking process that now exists151 could turn 
into a process where directors are pitted against each other (e.g., one 
director claiming that other directors withheld relevant information) to 
 
148 Recognizing a higher standard of care for officers would be one way to account 
for this problem.  See Lyman P.Q. Johnson and David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate 
Officers are Fiduciaries, 46 WM & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1642 (2005) (“[t]here are fewer 
policy justifications for applying the business judgment rule to officers than directors, 
just as there are policy factors supporting greater liability risk for officers, compared to 
directors”) (citation omitted); Wade, supra note 6, at 770: 
I conclude that courts and attorneys should distinguish analysis of the 
duty of care owed by corporate executives or managers from the duty 
of care owed by directors. I suggest an analytical approach that 
distinguishes the standard of care owed by officers from that owed by 
directors. Principles requiring reasonableness and rationality govern 
duty of care analysis for both directors and officers. The standard of 
care owed by officers and directors is the same, but the amount of care 
owed by a company's managers, dealing with day to day affairs, is 
unavoidably higher than the amount of care owed by a company's 
outside directors, who have far less contact and involvement with the 
company. 
149 See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text. 
150 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
151 See supra note 9 (citing sources on board decisionmaking by consensus). 
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avoid culpability.152 Board minutes might become detailed to the point of 
showing the role that each director played in deliberations, focusing the 
directors’ attention on personal perseverance rather than the business of 
the corporation.153 In cases that go to trial, directors facing individual 
treatment might request separate counsel due to their individual exposure.  
This could add to the cost of corporate reimbursement for directors’ 
attorney’s fees, and could make trials unruly given an average board size 
of seven to nine directors.154 An individual focus could also require courts 
to itemize and account for individual differences among directors 
(including a director’s insider/outsider status and expert/non-expert 
qualifications155) to assess due care compliance.  As a result, both board 
and judicial efficiency would suffer if an individual approach was applied 
in duty of care cases.  Finally, it is unclear whether an individual approach 
would be viable for assessing due care breaches, as it might be difficult to 
establish that the careless director was the proximate cause of any harm. 
All of this is not to suggest that we should be unconcerned with a 
single director’s carelessness, or that we should excuse outside directors 
who do not monitor.156 The possibility exists that one negligent director, 
had she been sufficiently informed, could have swayed the board’s vote 
toward an advisable course of action.  This hypothetical scenario unfolds 
in classic movie 12 Angry Men,157 albeit in the jury room rather than the 
boardroom.  In that movie, Henry Fonda is the only juror who believes – 
correctly it turns out – that a criminal defendant is not guilty.  He ends up 
convincing the other jurors, and the jury makes the right decision to 
acquit.  There is anecdotal evidence that even one director can have the 
same type of effect in a boardroom.158 While this may be a tempting 
 
152 Critics of the move toward greater director independence note the advantages of 
a collegial board.  [cites] 
153 See Samuel N. Fraidin, Duty of Care Jurisprudence:  Comparing Judicial 
Intrusion and Social Psychology Research, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 28-32 (2004) 
(suggesting that the discovery of notes from board meetings may chill discussions among 
directors). 
154 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board?  Group Decisionmaking in 
Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 42 (2002) (“board sizes vary widely. A 
1999 survey found that slightly less than half had seven to nine members, with the 
remaining boards scattered evenly on either side of that range”). 
155 See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text. 
156 Section 11 of the federal Securities Act could be seen as adopting an individual 
approach for unintentional acts.  Section 11 imposes liability on outside directors for 
material misstatements or omissions in registration statements, yet provides them with an 
individualized due diligence defense.  See 15 U.S.C. § 77(k)(b) (2005); Sale, supra note 
52, at __ (“directors who are active and engaged, who ask questions, and who vet before 
signing, will not be liable”); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Due Diligence Defense Under 
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 44 BRANDEIS L. J. 549 (2006).   
157 12 ANGRY MEN (Metro Goldwyn Mayer/United Artists 1957). 
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reason to favor an individual approach in the due care setting, on balance 
this approach would do more harm than good by penalizing isolated cases 
of negligence even if the board as a whole functioned adequately. 
A final question must be asked before discussing what a duty-
specific answer to the individual/collective question can tell us about 
fiduciary duties more generally.  That is, how is a preference for the 
collective approach in duty of care cases affected, if at all, by delegation to 
a board committee?159 Specifically, to what extent should the full board, 
which later approves the committee’s recommendation, be allowed to rely 
on the due care exercised by the committee, as opposed to its own due 
care?  On the one hand, corporate law allows boards to establish and 
delegate to committees,160 and the board’s decision to delegate is protected 
by the business judgment rule.161 On the other hand, Bainbridge has 
identified social science literature that touts the desirability of group 
decisionmaking, suggesting that we should be hesitant to allow too much 
delegation if a committee’s membership is too small to preserve these 
benefits.162 On balance, because committees are likely to have greater 
knowledge and expertise of matters within their purview, and because they 
are an accepted part of the corporate governance mechanism, it may be 
advisable to allow a properly functioning committee to exercise care on 
 
158 See Rakesh Khurana and Katharina Pick, The Social Nature of Boards, 70 
BROOK. L. REV. 1259, 1273 (2005) (noting that “[o]bservers say that even a lone 
dissenter can make a big difference in the board room” and relaying one story where a 
single director’s hesitation caused the board to reverse their initial approval of an 
acquisition). 
159 On board committees and their roles, see April Klein, Firm Performance and 
Board Committee Structure, 41 J. L. & ECON. 275, 277-78 (1998). 
160 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 141(c); MBCA § 8.25. 
161 See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 943 (Del. 1985): 
An informed decision to delegate a task is as much an exercise of 
business judgment as any other.  The realities of modern corporate life 
are such that directors cannot be expected to manage the day-to-day 
activities of a company.  This is recognized by the provisions of 8 
Del.C. § 141(a) that the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation 
are managed “by or under the direction” of its board.  In setting its 
agenda as to the matters in which it will be directly involved, and those 
it will delegate, a board's decisions in those areas are entitled to equal 
consideration as exercises of business judgment.  
(citation omitted). 
162 See Bainbridge, supra note 154, at 12-19.  Cf. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The 
Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 89, 96-97 (2004) (“while the multiple input found in groups often leads to superior 
decisions than made by a single individual, it is less clear from experimental studies of 
group decision-making whether this requires the group to act as peers, with 
disagreements ultimately resolved by majority rule, rather than as a ‘cabinet’ to a single 
person who has the final say.”).  The countervailing fear is that groupthink will become 
prevalent.  See Bainbridge, supra note 154, at 32. 
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behalf of the full board.163 On the other hand, the decision might depend 
on the size of the committee and perhaps also the gravity of the matter 
under review.164 
IV 
BROADER OBSERVATIONS ABOUT FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
If courts are oscillating between an individual and collective focus 
on directors depending on the type of fiduciary duty at issue, and if this 
distinction is desirable on corporate governance policy grounds, how does 
this inform the broader fiduciary duty literature?  In particular, what does 
the courts’ answer to the individual/collective question tell us about the 
role of fiduciary duties as a corporate governance mechanism? 
The courts’ focus on individual directors in loyalty cases, contrasted 
with their focus on the board as a whole in due care cases, permits several 
important observations about fiduciary duties.  First, it reveals that the 
divide between the traditional duties of care and loyalty is even wider than 
presently acknowledged.  Recovery for duty of care breaches is highly 
unlikely due to the protective provisions of the business judgment rule and 
the widespread adoption of § 102(b)(7) exculpation clauses.165 Indeed, by 
finding no due care violations even in a case like Disney that involved 
highly lax director behavior, the Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed Van 
Gorkom’s status as an outlier in corporate law.  If a collective approach to 
assessing liability requires several grossly negligent directors, rather than 
just one, it makes the possibility of recovery all the more remote.  On the 
other hand, plaintiffs are generally more successful in classic duty of 
loyalty claims,166 and the stricter individual director approach further tips 
the scales in plaintiffs’ favor.  Consequently, this contextualized choice of 
assessment approach reveals a further splintering between the duties of 
care and loyalty, with courts significantly more likely to impose liability 
 
163 On the benefits of committees, see Anup Agrawal & Shiba Chadha, Corporate 
Governance and Accounting Scandals 48 J. L. & ECON. 371 (2005) (empirical study 
found that audit committees having an independent director with financial expertise issue 
less financial restatements). 
164 If a committee is comprised of a single member, as is permitted under both 
Delaware law and the MBCA, the committee’s due care should probably not be a 
substitute for the board’s due care.  Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 141(c)(1) (“The board of 
directors may, by resolution passed by a majority of the whole board, designate 1 or more 
committees, each committee to consist of 1 or more of the directors of the corporation.”); 
MBCA § 8.25(a) (“a board of directors may create one or more committees and appoint 
one or more members of the board of directors to serve on any such committee”).   
165 See supra notes 133-136 and accompanying text. 
166 This was the case even before the enactment of § 102(b)(7).  See Tamar 
Frankel, Corporate Directors' Duty of Care:  The American Law Institute's Project on 
Corporate Governance, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 705, 716 (1984) (“Courts do not base 
their decisions on the duty of care often as they do on the duty of loyalty, but invoke the 
duty of care in special cases when directors have no conflicts of interest.”). 
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for disloyalty while leaving problems of carelessness to market, 
reputational, and social sanctions.167 
Second, this article began by noting that fiduciary duty law currently 
serves as a weak mechanism for policing directors, and that several 
corporate law scholars have argued in favor of more robust fiduciary law 
in the wake of recent corporate scandals.168 If due care liability will not be 
revived – and Disney suggests that it will not be – another hope for 
achieving this result was a more explicit duty to act in good faith that 
could expand or supplement the traditional duties.169 Although the 
Delaware Supreme Court has now been more explicit about a requirement 
to act in good faith, bad faith has been narrowly defined to include only 
intentional misconduct.170 Thus while good faith might somewhat expand 
the grasp of fiduciary law, all unintentional misconduct still appears to be 
out of reach.  By putting good faith on the loyalty side of the dividing line, 
the Court reaffirmed that fiduciary law is meant to penalize only the most 
egregious offenders through legal sanctions.  Judicial use of an individual 
approach in these “extreme” cases, compared to a collective approach in 
all other cases, further assures this separation.  Importantly, it also reveals 
a judicial deemphasis on fiduciary liability as a corporate governance 
mechanism. 
Finally, if courts are dividing the world of fiduciary liability into 
intentional and unintentional cases, using an individual or collective focus 
as their tool, why are they not more explicit about this?  Each fiduciary 
duty suit that goes to trial requires a judicial choice between the individual 
and collective approaches, either explicitly or implicitly.  But recall that 
only three major cases – Van Gorkom, Emerging Communications, and 
Disney – explicitly speak to this question, and then only superficially.171 
When implicit cases are considered, loyalty’s preference for the individual 
approach is easier to see than due care’s preference for the collective 
approach.172 The question becomes, have courts overlooked the 
importance of the individual/collective choice in duty of care cases, or is 
there a reason for only an implicit preference?   
 
167 On reputational and social sanctions, see Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners:  
How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997); Daniel 
Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1287-90 (1982); 
Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 NYU L. REV. 733, 
747-56 (2005); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 
(2001); Eisenberg, supra note 66. 
168 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
169 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.  
170 See supra notes 124-128 and accompanying text. 
171 See supra Part II.A.  
172 See supra Part II.B. 
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The answer might be found in an important discussion distinguishing 
corporate law’s “standards of conduct” from its “standards of liability.”173 
Melvin Eisenberg and Gordon Smith have observed that standards of 
conduct tell directors how to behave, while standards of liability tell 
judges when to impose liability for director misbehavior.174 There can be 
a significant distance between standards of conduct and standards of 
liability, as illustrated by the duty of care.175 The standard of conduct tells 
directors to act with “due care,” or “with the care that an ordinarily 
prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position 
and under similar circumstances.”176 But the standard of liability tells 
judges to assess liability (or grant injunctive relief) only when the 
directors’ actions are irrational – i.e., not a valid exercise of business 
judgment.177 A bifurcated structure thus encourages best practices, but 
only penalizes unacceptable practices.178 It aspires for a board that 
functions perfectly, penalizes a board that functions inadequately, and 
tolerates a board that falls somewhere in between. 
This bifurcated structure fails to work, however, when directors 
“hear” what is meant to be heard by judges – i.e., standards of liability 
instead of standards of conduct.  Directors who hear laxer standards of 
liability may be less likely to strive for higher standards of conduct.  To 
maintain bifurcation, at least to the extent possible in the real world, 
standards of conduct should be made clear, while standards of liability 
 
173 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and 
Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993); Smith, supra 
note 71.  This corporate law discussion is based on an important article by Meir Dan-
Cohen separating “decision rules” from “conduct rules” in the criminal context.  Meir 
Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules:  On Acoustic Separation in Criminal 
Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). 
174 See Eisenberg, supra note 173, at 465; Smith, supra note 71, at 1204. 
175 Eisenberg also observes a distance between the standards of conduct and 
standards of review in the case of the duty of loyalty.  Eisenberg, supra note 173, at 464 
(“In the area of loyalty…the law’s command to directors and officers is the standard of 
conduct, ‘deal fairly when you deal in your own self-interest,’ not the standard of review, 
‘deal as you need to deal to get approval by your colleagues.’”). 
176 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 92, at § 4.01. 
177 See Eisenberg, supra note 173, at 445-46: 
Most of the justifications for the business judgment rule center on 
liability consequences:  in particular, on the potential unfairness of 
imposing liability for a good decision that turned out badly; on the 
perverse incentive effects that might result from a reasonability 
standard of review in liability cases; and on the disproportion between 
the potential liability for making an imprudent decision and the 
incentives for serving as an outside director. 
178 As Chancellor Chandler reaffirmed in Disney, actual practices can fall far short 
of best practices without the imposition of liability.  2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *3-8. 
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should be obfuscated.179 Accordingly, an explicit adoption of the 
collective approach in the due care context would run the risk of being 
heard by directors, thereby telling them of an important barrier to liability.  
For this reason, Smith rightly critiques the MBCA’s explicit adoption of 
the collective approach, noting that “[b]y shifting the focus from the 
individual director to the board as a collegial body, the MBCA dampens 
the force of its command.”180 Delaware courts, on the other hand, 
presciently maintain “vagueness in enunciating the decision rule”181 by 
only implicitly adopting the collective approach.   
 
V
CONCLUSION 
Fiduciary duties are often litigated, and are a favorite topic of 
discussion among corporate law scholars.  This makes it rather surprising 
that an important question within fiduciary law – whether director liability 
should be assessed individually or collectively – has been virtually 
ignored.  This article tackles the individual/collective question and sets 
forth a systematic way of approaching it.  It favors a duty-specific answer 
to this question on both descriptive and normative grounds.  
While this article has provided a general framework for answering 
the individual/collective question, it has also left some specific questions 
unanswered.  For instance, most of the judicial opinions that were 
discussed in the article were issued after a full trial on the merits.  But 
many fiduciary duty cases do not make it this far, which leaves the 
question of whether the individual/collective problem presents itself, and 
in the same way, during the earlier stages of litigation?182 Also, many 
factual scenarios resist tidy classification as straight “loyalty” or “due 
care” cases, which complicates matters.  For example, what would the 
individual/collective analysis look like when a board has adopted 
questionable takeover defenses against an acquisition, where the 
 
179 Eisenberg, supra note 173, at 466 (“standards of conduct…should be simple, so 
that they can be effectively communicated, and to the extent possible should reflect social 
norms of uprights business behavior that directors and officer scan be expected to know 
even if they do not know the law”); id. (“standards of review may rest on social 
propositions other than norms of upright business behavior, and correspondingly may be 
formulated in a more complex manner than standards of conduct”). 
180 Smith, supra note 71, at 1213 (emphasis added). 
181 Id. at 1206.  See also William T. Allen, Tribute to Chancellor William T. Allen:  
Ambiguity in Corporation Law, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 894 (1997). 
182 The existing law on demand futility and special committee dismissals must be 
taken into account here, and not lightly disturbed.  See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 
814 (Del. 1984) (basis for excusing demand includes that a majority of the board was 
disinterested and independent or that the challenged decision was a valid exercise of 
business judgment); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (inquiry into 
the independence of the special committee). 
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“enhanced scrutiny” standard requires courts to review the transaction 
more carefully than due care claims but more deferentially than loyalty 
claims?183 
Finally, although this article works within the confines of fiduciary 
duty suits, the individual/collective question may also be important in 
other areas of corporate law.184 According to the Wall Street Journal, the 
individual/collective question might have ramifications for D&O 
insurance coverage in stock option backdating claims: 
 
In the realm of directors and officers insurance, lawyers are 
examining whether an insurer can argue that misconduct by 
a single director or executive in granting or dating stock 
options can justify refusing to honor coverage for all of the 
other directors and officers who were involved in making 
the grant even if they didn’t participate in the 
misconduct.185 
The individual/collective question is an important one, in fiduciary 
duty suits and beyond.  So far, courts have been answering this question 
correctly, even if their rationale has been less than forthcoming. 
 
183 Under enhanced scrutiny review, the board must show that it had reasonable 
grounds for believing a threat to corporate policy existed, and that the takeover defenses 
were a proportionate response to that threat.  See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 
493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
184 One such area is Section 11 of the Securities Act, which adopts something 
resembling the individual approach.  See supra note 156. 
185 Peter Lattman, Law Firms Find Backdating Probes are Lucrative, Wall St. J,
July 19, 2006, B1, B2. 
 
